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vABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the U.S. pivot to Asia to determine whether energy security 
issues are likely to complicate relations and/or lead to friction between the United States 
and China in the twenty-first century. Drawing on case studies in which energy issues 
directly and indirectly drive states’ decisions to use military force to secure access to 
energy resources, or leverage access to resources as a means of coercive diplomacy, this 
research projects how similar scenarios may develop in the twenty-first century. The 
analysis also supports the notion that mutual interests in access to Middle Eastern 
energy resources and centrality of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in its 
transport could result in cooperative security arrangements in the absence of 
preferential access to any country. Conflict could potentially result from territorial 
disputes involving U.S. collective defense treaty allies. For this reason, it is 
recommended that the United States pursue a diplomatic solution to territorial disputes 
and avoid policies that limit China’s access to the SLOCs. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  THESIS STRUCTURE .............................................................................1 




II.  LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................7 
A.  ISSUES ........................................................................................................7 
1.  Transportation Vulnerabilities ...................................................13 
2.  Economics .....................................................................................15 
B.  DETERRENTS ........................................................................................19 
1.  Cyber Vulnerability .....................................................................19 
2.  Military Buildup...........................................................................22 
C.  COOPERATION .....................................................................................25 
1.  Climate Change ............................................................................26 
D.  EXISTING LITERATURE.....................................................................29 
III.  UPDATING THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT ............................................33 
A.  CHOKEPOINTS ......................................................................................33 
B.  CHINA/CENTRAL ASIA/UNITED STATES ......................................43 
IV.  CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................................59 
A.  JAPAN ......................................................................................................59 
B.  ARAB OIL EMBARGO OF 1973 ..........................................................64 
C.  RUSSIA AND EUROPE .........................................................................68 
D.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................71 
V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................73 
A.  IMPLICATIONS .....................................................................................73 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................79 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................93 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Regional military expenditure in $billions ................................................25 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A2/AD  Anti-Access/Area Denial 
ADIZ   Air Defense Identification Zone 
b/d   Barrels per day 
CAGP   Central Asian Gas Pipeline 
CNOOC  China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC   China National Petroleum Corporation 
CPEC   China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
CSS   Carbon Capture Storage 
CTF   Combined Task Force 
DoD   Department of Defense 
EEZ   Economic Exclusion Zone 
EIA   Energy Information Administration 
EIS   Eye in the Sky  
ESPO   Eastern Siberian Oil Fields 
EU   European Union 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GHG   Greenhouse gas 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
IUED   Improvised underwater explosive device 
JCPOA  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
LNG   Liquefied Natural Gas 
NOCs   Nationalized oil companies 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
OPEC   Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
R&D   Research and Development 
RCEP   Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
SINOPEC  China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
SLOC   Sea Lanes of Communication 
SPR   Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
 xii
TAPI   Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
TPP   Trans-Pacific Partnership  













I wish to thank my professors in the Department of National Security Affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School who helped to expand my knowledge of an area with 
which I have had no previous experience. I would also like to express my thanks and 
gratitude to my primary advisor, Professor James Russell, for his patience and guidance 
throughout this process, and extend thanks and gratitude to my second reader, Professor 
Daniel Moran, for his input that helped to steer me during this learning process. 
 xiv




A. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is designed to develop a comprehensive understanding of how energy 
security has shaped the geopolitical environment, and how energy-related considerations 
may influence the future relationship between the United States and China. For this 
understanding, we draw on a number of case studies from the twentieth century that saw 
energy issues directly and indirectly drive states’ decisions to use military force, either in 
securing access to energy resources, or to leverage access to resources as a means of 
coercive diplomacy. After evaluating Chinese and U.S. policies, we will consider 
whether similar scenarios may develop in the twenty-first century between China and the 
United States, based on the historical analysis. The importance of this thesis is to identify 
potential friction points between these two countries, so that U.S. policies can be shaped 
to avoid conflict with China. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The United States has played a large role in guaranteeing global access to energy 
markets through its peace and stability operations. Due to the pace of developments 
within the global energy market, an updated analysis of the current environment and 
future projections is of value to determine the market’s strengths and potential 
weaknesses. If regional conflict is to be avoided, how should increased U.S. military, 
diplomatic, and economic prioritization of the Asia Pacific region affect America’s 
energy security strategy? China’s dependence on U.S. security of the Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOC) from the Persian Gulf region to Asia has been identified as a 
critical vulnerability and has resulted in Beijing taking actions which may result in 
conflict, or the potential disruption of the flow of energy resources through the SLOCs.1 
                                                 
1 Michael Sliwinski, “Dire Straits: Naval Security Competition Between China and the United States 




Within the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), Washington’s list of national interests 
is:  
Security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a 
strong and innovative, and growing American economy in an open 
international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; 
respect for universal values at home and around the world; and a rules-
based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet 
global challenges.2  
In pursuing these interests, Washington has listed eight “top strategic risks to our 
interests,” which are intended to guide leadership in allocating limited resources to 
priority threats.3 Within the listed threats, seven are relatable to energy security: 
“Catastrophic attack on . . . critical infrastructure; threats or attacks against . . . our allies; 
. . . widespread economic slowdown; climate change; major energy market disruptions; 
and significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states.”4 
Given the prioritization of energy-related strategic threats to national interests, it 
is worth examining what caused the U.S. shift to the Pacific and how it addresses these 
threats. China’s actions are relatable to what Washington has identified as top priorities in 
national policy. As communicated in the NSS, “the United States welcomes the rise of a 
stable, peaceful, and prosperous China,”5 but Beijing’s aggressive actions in the East and 
South China Seas, ambiguity of China’s territorial claims delineated in the nine dash line, 
Beijing’s military buildup, its development of military logistics bases, and pursuit of a 
regional free-trade agreement (FTA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), which excludes the United States, can all be perceived as potential threats, as 
identified by the NSS. Understanding how and why states used force with regard to 
energy security may help to clarify how and why China is pursuing such actions, and 
whether U.S. policies in the region are applicable to the current environment. 
                                                 
2 White House, National Security Strategy 2015, 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 24. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS 
Competition over energy-related territories has the potential to aggravate relations 
in the East and South China Seas, creating the potential for armed conflict between the 
United States and China. The U.S. pivot to the Pacific is a strategy that addresses possible 
drivers for China’s energy security strategy and uses Washington’s military posture to 
serve as a deterrent to China exercising military force to gain control of the SLOCs or 
control over disputed territory throughout the region, while maintaining military 
dominance in the region in the event of failed diplomacy. A review of the contemporary 
energy market will show that despite decreased energy intensity per unit of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), population and economic growth are producing energy 
demands that complicate energy security for import-dependent countries. In addition  
to demand growth, it is necessary to evaluate the issues that perplex energy security in 
order to account for the strengths and weaknesses of both Beijing and Washington’s 
strategies. Relating the priorities listed in the NSS to this thesis, the U.S. strategy in the 
Pacific takes into account issues concerning cyber threats, energy resources, 
transportation vulnerabilities, the ensuing military buildup, access to Asia’s market and 
climate change implications. Beijing’s inescapable dependence on hydrocarbon imports 
makes ensuring access to energy through the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz an 
indispensable objective. As a result, China has approached the issue of energy security by 
diversifying its energy portfolio and developing a military capability to protect its 
national interests. In addition to potentially challenging the U.S.’s position in the SLOCs, 
Beijing has included asserting sovereignty over potential energy reserves in disputed 
areas of the East and South China Seas as part of its diversification strategy. In order to 
avoid conflict, a diplomatic solution to territorial disputes concerning energy resources 
must be found and the United States should avoid employing coercive energy strategies 
concerning access to the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. 
The biggest obstacle to energy security is getting states to cooperate rather than 
compete over resources. Competition over market shares involves both importing and 
exporting countries by way of supply security and demand security, respectively. 
Exporters are competing with the emergence of alternative energy sources and with each 
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other over the world’s consumer base in order to maximize profits and to maintain their 
ability to leverage supply as a tool of coercive diplomacy; greater market shares equate to 
increased profits and greater influence in the international community. Importers are 
competing over access and/or control of energy resources, control being considered the 
more secure form of energy security. 
Supply security is a term that will be used to describe measures taken by states to 
secure continued access to import supplies and limit the influence and impact that 
exporters can exert on net importers. The United States’ use of an oil embargo on Japan 
in World War II and subsequent use of oil as a strategic weapon; the 1973 Arab oil 
embargo; and Russia’s evolving relationship with Europe in the post-Cold War era—all 
are examples of the use of supply controls to exert diplomatic pressure on target states, 
and all ultimately failed to produce the desired results. Insights gleaned from these 
examples also include two instances of states using military force to gain control of 
resource-rich territories. Applying these examples to tensions resulting from territorial 
disputes and threats to SLOCs access in the Asia-Pacific region provide three scenarios 
of potential conflict between the United States and China: first, if the United States 
attempts to exert diplomatic pressure on China by leveraging control of the Straits of 
Malacca and Hormuz; second, if China attempts to exert control over the Straits of 
Malacca and/or Hormuz; and lastly, territorial disputes over resource-rich areas in the 
Asia Pacific region involving U.S. collective defense treaty allies. 
Strengthening economic and military ties with regional actors in the Asia Pacific 
allows the United States to increase its influence in Asia’s growing market and provide a 
deterrent base for weaker states against Beijing’s aggressive behavior. An assumption 
made in this thesis is that China will not engage the United States directly over territorial  
 
 
disputes due to the disparity in military capabilities, but would potentially resort to 
violence in the event of supply disruption by Washington. The peaceful rise of China 
depends on how Beijing and Washington settle territorial disputes in the region and 
issues concerning security of the SLOCs. Recommendations for a diplomatic agreement 
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concerning sovereignty rights in the East and South China Seas, development of a 
multilateral cooperative security arrangement for the SLOCs, and protectionist policies 
for shale infrastructure in order to stabilize market price are detailed in Chapter four of 
this thesis. 
Analyzing the current energy market is necessary to understand the variables 
affecting geopolitics with regard to energy security. Answering why states used force in 
the pursuit of energy security in the three case studies reveals rational decisions, based on 
their given geopolitical environment and calculations of acceptable risk. The variables 
affecting Beijing and Washington’s calculus are grouped in this thesis by issues, 
deterrents, and areas of cooperation. 
D. ISSUES 
This section of the thesis covers issues that were encountered during research. 
The historical examples used in this thesis use declassified, promulgated, and translated 
information that is not as readily available for the selected topic of study. Current policies 
and the associated decision making process have not been released, declassified, or 
translated to the level of the case studies. For example, during the time of research, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and RCEP were still under development and had not 
promulgated details of the regional FTAs. Without a finalized framework, analysis is 
limited to deduction of how the free trade agreements would potentially impact the global 
market and increase Washington’s stake in Asia. Similarly, Beijing and Washington’s 
policies are relatively new and do not have extensive literature exploring their 
implications on the geopolitical and energy security environment. Projections concerning 
future demand, production, and energy-mix data cannot account for major changes that 
may occur over a 15-year period, such as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake’s effects on the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that altered Japan’s energy infrastructure, or 
technological advancements like horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing that increase 
production. The deterrents section of this chapter is limited to unclassified material and 
existing knowledge concerning Chinese plans and current military capabilities; a better 
understanding of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment would provide 
 6
better insight into possible deterrent considerations for both countries. The A2/AD 
environment refers to a military operation’s area that has been subject to weapons 
systems designed to degrade or deny the use of platform systems or deny force access to 
geographic areas. For example, the use of electromagnetic pulse technology or cyber 
intrusion of force communications network would degrade U.S. force capabilities 
operating in the area. Knowing whether the United States possesses capabilities to 
counter China’s cyber force and missile defense would be invaluable in determining how 
Washington may move forward in the event of direct confrontation with Beijing. This is 
not to say that these issues invalidate this thesis, but it is worth noting that they were 
limiting factors on the amount of information available and are also based on variables 
that are subject to change. 
E. METHODOLOGY/SOURCES 
The methodology used in this thesis draws on historical analysis to identify 
circumstances that led to states using force to gain control over energy resources and/or 
coercive diplomacy to influence policies of target states. From this analysis, it is possible 
to deduce potential friction points between Washington and Beijing, given their current 
policies and actions in the geopolitical and energy security environment.  
First, this thesis discusses the current environment in order to develop an 
understanding of what variables are influencing policy makers’ decisions. Second, the 
following three case studies will be analyzed: Washington’s use of energy diplomacy and 
energy as a strategic weapon against Japan in World War II; the 1973 Arab oil embargo; 
and Russia’s evolving relationship with Europe in the post-Cold War era. Third, build 
upon the case findings to deduce possible implications in the current environment. 
Finally, this thesis will provide policy recommendations to prevent conflict. 
This thesis draws its research from scholarly works, policy documents, news 
reports, government websites, congressional research reports, and independent resource 
institutions. Foreign sources are limited to available translated texts and analysis based 
upon translated work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to familiarize the reader with essential 
background information, discuss what work has already been done on the topic, and 
describe how this thesis adds to the existing literature. An overview providing essential 
information concerning the current geopolitical and energy security environment will be 
divided by issues, deterrents, and areas of cooperation. Then, a summary of the existing 
literature explaining implications of the U.S. prioritization of the Asia Pacific region and 
the current energy security environment will be discussed, followed by an explanation of 
how this thesis contributes to the field.  
A. ISSUES 
Competition over the energy resources required to supply today’s 7.1 billion 
people has the potential to become more volatile, as the world’s population increases to 
an expected 8.3 billion by 2030; the associated growth in demand will generate additional 
pressure on states to secure the world’s limited supply.6 Government policies developed 
to secure these resources will be based on the calculus of acceptable costs and risks 
associated with their energy mix. This section will discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of energy sources, transportation issues, and economics in order to understand their 
influence in a state’s decision-making process. 
Hydrocarbons, in the form of oil, gas, and coal, are responsible for meeting a 
majority of the world’s primary energy needs. Each of these commodities possesses 
natural characteristics that make them more or less applicable to various sectors within 
the energy mix. The term energy mix is used to describe the proportion of a state’s total 
energy generation that is provided for by a particular energy source; for example, within 
the total demand for electricity in a given state, nuclear power, fossil fuels, and 
renewables are each responsible for a portion of total generation. Issues of 
                                                 
6 “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
December 2012, 31, accessed September 15, 2015, 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf. 
 8
transportability, price, availability, and acceptable environmental costs are variables that 
influence how these resources are used. The use of renewable energy sources, such as 
wind, hydro, solar and the use of nuclear power are gaining market shares within the 
energy system; however, they are limited by their price comparison to hydrocarbon, 
human capital requirements, and environmental conditions that limit their applicability 
and inconsistent power outputs. For the purpose of this thesis, discussion of a state’s 
energy mix will be limited to the transportation sector and stationary power generation. 
The general trend among countries is their inability to meet demand with domestic 
production. Dependence upon energy imports carries the inherent risk of disruptions, 
which have shaped the world’s energy security norm of diversifying import sources, 
diversifying energy sources, creating demand-side controls, and establishing strategic 
petroleum reserves with disruption mitigation plans. 
Petroleum dominates the transportation sector, as the difficulty in using coal or 
gas to fuel automobiles, aircrafts, and ships will ensure transportation continues to 
generate more than half of the world’s petroleum demand.7 Being an energy-dense-liquid 
allows oil to be more versatile, mobile, and storable than other energy sources.8 As of 
2013, the world’s proven petroleum reserves were estimated at 1.64 trillion barrels, of 
which the Middle East accounted for 49%, Central and South America 20%, North 
America 13%, Africa 8%, Eurasia 7%, and Asia 3%.9 The issue that these statistics 
present is that the world’s largest consumers of petroleum are becoming increasingly 
dependent upon volatile regions of the world to meet their demand. This case is 
especially true for the Asia-Pacific region, only accounting for only 3% of the world’s 
proven reserves; it represents the largest demand growth and is projected to increase 
                                                 
7 Ian Cronshaw and Quentin Grafton, “Reflections on Energy Security in the Asia Pacific,” Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 1, no. 1 (2013): 134, doi:10.1002/app5.4. 
8 Thomas Birtchnell, Satya Savitzky, and John Urry, Cargo Mobilities: Moving Materials in a Global 
Age (New York: Routledge, 2015), 184. 
9 Ron Patterson, “World Proved Oil Reserves Data a Work of Fiction,” Oil Price, December 9, 2014, 
World Oil Reserves by Region, accessed January 15, 2016, http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/World-
Proved-Oil-Reserves-Data-A-Work-Of-Fiction.html. 
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another 30% between 2010 and 2035.10 The general trend of increasing demand will 
generate competition among consumers, as limited global production capacity will not be 
able to keep pace; some projections forecast that Saudi Arabia, which possesses the 
world’s second-largest proven oil reserves, may become a net importer of oil by 2037, 
based on demand and production growth.11 The difficulty in fuel switching transportation 
sectors toward alternative energy sources makes it difficult for states to avoid increased 
reliance on oil. 
Natural gas is more difficult than oil to extract, store, and transport, but is more 
abundant and widely distributed throughout the world than petroleum. These 
characteristics make it an economical alternative to petroleum for power generation.12 As 
of 2014, gas had a 23.7% stake in the global primary energy mix and is expected to 
increase steadily over the next two decades.13 Despite having a greater share of the 
world’s natural gas reserves than it does oil, China is still dependent on more than 40% of 
its natural gas imports to meet demand. Natural gas burns cleaner than other 
hydrocarbons and offers a reduced environmental cost in meeting energy requirements.14 
As in the case of oil, net importing states are becoming more vulnerable to supply 
disruptions as they grow increasingly dependent upon gas imports. A weakness of gas is 
due to its physical characteristics requiring pressurized systems for transport. The 
increased capital and labor associated with pressurizing pipelines and required liquefied 
                                                 
10 Cronshaw and Grafton, “Reflections on Energy,” 131. 
11 “Global Trends 2030,” 75. 
12 Bruce Jones, David Steven, and Emily O’Brien, Fueling a New Disorder? The New Geopolitical 
and Security Consequences of Energy, Brookings Institute, Brookings, March 2014, 6, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/14-geopolitical-security-consequences-
energy-jones/14-geopolitical-security-energy-jones-steven_fixed.pdf. 
13 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 June 2015,” BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 64 (June 2015): 4, accessed January 5, 2016, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-
economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf. 
14 Ji Guoxing, “Energy Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,” Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 8, no. 2 (1996): 276, accessed September 10, 2015, doi:10.1080/10163279609464566. 
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natural gas (LNG) infrastructure on both the supplier and importer ends of maritime 
transport is a factor that has limited its rate of growth in the energy mix.15 
Coal is more evenly dispersed than other hydrocarbons, but comes at an increased 
cost to the environment and is limited to stationary power generation. A 2014 British 
Petroleum report estimates that North America accounts for 27.5%; South and Central 
America 1.6%; Europe and Eurasia 34.8%; the Middle East and Africa 3.7%; and the 
Asia-Pacific region 32.3% of proven coal reserves.16 Coal accounts for a 30% stake of 
the world’s primary energy mix.17 Coal’s physical characteristics make it easy to 
transport, store, and use in electricity production, but it is the most carbon-intensive 
source of power generation of all energy resources and requires the implementation of 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CSS) technology to meet climate change initiative targets.18 
The capital required to close less efficient coal plants, retrofit them with CSS, or build 
new, more efficient plants makes it increasingly difficult for developing countries to 
prioritize climate change over providing electricity to their citizens. Despite China’s large 
coal deposits, its economic development over the last three decades resulted in it 
becoming a net importer of coal in 2009, in response to the associated increase in energy 
demand; import data from 2009 to 2012 indicate that despite becoming the world’s 
largest importer of coal, it only accounts for 10% of Beijing’s total coal demand.19 With 
Asia representing the largest growth in energy demand and carbon emissions through the 
foreseeable future and coal being a hydrocarbon of convenience, it will become 
increasingly difficult to steer developing economies toward more expensive green 
technology.20 
                                                 
15 “Energy Supply Security: Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014,” International Energy 
Agency, 2014, 53–6, accessed January 1, 2016, 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ENERGYSUPPLYSECURITY2014.pdf. 
16 “BP Statistical Review,” 5–30. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Coal,” International Energy Agency, About Coal, accessed January 20, 2016, 
http://www.iea.org/topics/coal/. 
19 Cronshaw and Grafton, “Reflections on Energy,” 134. 
20 “China,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, May 14, 2015, Overview, accessed August 20, 
2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
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Compared to hydrocarbons, nuclear power offers a carbon-free power generation 
source, but carries the risk of radiological contamination. With construction periods of 
approximately 20 years and substantial financial requirements to build, operate, and 
maintain plants, many countries lack the human capital and technology to consider 
nuclear power as a near-term solution.21 While peaceful nuclear programs do not 
necessarily factor heavily upon neighboring countries evaluating their security 
environment, the latent capability brings to question the necessity of nuclear 
infrastructure, as in the case of Iran. Because of this, there is extensive literature 
discussing controlling supply as being the most practical means of nonproliferation and 
the spread of peaceful programs to the developing world presents a problem set beyond 
the scope of this thesis.22 The spread peaceful programs can be expected to mirror the 
guidelines established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and would 
have further implications on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Modest in comparison to 
other energy sources, nuclear power only accounts for 4.4% of the word’s primary energy 
mix and has been slowly gaining market shares since 2009.23 In light of recent 
developments concerning the JCPOA and Saudi Arabia’s 2011 announcement to build 
“no fewer than sixteen nuclear power plants at an estimated cost of over $100 billion,” 
nuclear power has the potential to alleviate oil exporters’ growing energy needs, extend 
the life of their hydrocarbon exports, and power water desalination plants.24 
The development of an economically viable biofuel that can be mass produced 
without forfeiting feedstock crops has the potential to impact the transportation sector 
where other forms of energy cannot.25 Currently only representing 1.8% of global oil 
usage, the two-million-barrels-per-day production is limited by the choice of feedstock 
                                                 
21 Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of 
Resource Management (London: Routledge, 2009), 39. 
22Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 15. 
23 “BP Statistical Review,” 5. 
24 Yoel Guzansky, “The Saudi Nuclear Genie is Out,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2015): 
93–96, accessed July 10, 2015, doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.1038176. 
25 Cronshaw and Grafton, “Reflections on Energy,” 134.  
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crops over fuel crops.26 Continued funding for research and development (R&D) is 
among the priorities listed in President Obama’s “all of the above energy strategy.”27 The 
United States Navy recently contracted for 77.6 million barrels of biofuel at $2.19 per 
gallon, which is currently being used in the Great Green Fleets 2016 Asia-Pacific 
deployment as a 10/90 mix ratio.28 Mandated by congress, the requirements to be 
economical compared to conventional fuel and able to be used as a drop-in fuel without 
engineering modifications have been met; further developments to reach the goal of a 
50/50 blend could provide a significant strategic advantage to the United States.29 
Wind, hydro, solar, and geothermal make up the renewable energy sector and 
collectively account for 6% of the world’s power generation.30 While this number is 
modest in comparison to other forms of energy production, the sector collectively 
accounted for nearly half of the world’s new power generation capacity in 2014.31 The 
issue facing the sector, in an environment of lower oil and gas prices, is staying 
economically competitive and it has unfortunately suffered from global investment 
stagnation as a result.32 In the long term, renewables will play an increasingly important 
role of decreasing reliance on energy imports and reducing carbon emissions; 
International Energy Agency (IEA) projections into 2030 anticipate modest growth, but 
show an appreciable increase by 2050, accounting for up to 12%-25%.33 Output 
variability due to weather conditions will be increasingly factored into the renewables 
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equation in light of climate change and the effects it will have on hydro sources, solar 
exposure, and wind patterns. 
Growing dependence upon energy imports are linked to the vitality of the world’s 
transportation infrastructure, both of which rely on the United States to maintain its 
security commitments to policing the SLOCs and providing stability in the Persian Gulf 
region.34 The perception of waning U.S. commitments to providing security in the Gulf 
and SLOCs has been influenced by several developments. First, increased domestic 
production in the United States resulting from the shale revolution has reduced its 
dependence upon petroleum imports, specifically from the Gulf States; second, budgetary 
constraints bring into question the U.S.’s ability to sustain operations in the Persian Gulf 
and SLOCs; finally, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is perceived as the United 
States reducing its security commitments to the Gulf region.35 In an environment which 
has traditionally depended upon the United States to provide security and access for the 
benefit of the global economy, the perception of a possible withdrawal has had an impact 
upon importing states’ considerations. 
1. Transportation Vulnerabilities 
The maritime transport system comprises “approximately 112,000 merchant 
vessels, 6,500 ports and harbor facilities, and 45,000 shipping bureaus . . . linking 
roughly 225 coastal nations. . .”36 This system facilitates the flow of approximately two-
thirds of the world’s produced petroleum and is a vital lifeline to the world’s economy.37 
The remaining one-third use pipelines, trains, and trucks to cover smaller distances.38 
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Chokepoints along the established transit routes are limited in capacity due to 
geographical features and results in the convergence of energy exports from various 
suppliers into essentially one common source. In 2010, approximately 76% of the Middle 
East’s petroleum exports went to Asia, as a result of growing demand in the region, 
resulting in an increased dependence upon two primary chokepoints, the Straits of 
Hormuz and Malacca.39 Importing from a number of different suppliers, helps limit the 
effects of possible disruption from one or two suppliers, but offers limited security 
against a concerted disruption, or a disruption of a maritime chokepoint. The world has 
seen a general decline in maritime piracy, down to 245 incidents in 2014 from 445 in 
2010, but the Asia-Pacific region has maintained a relatively consistent number of 
incidents over the same period.40 Overlapping policies governing the waters of the Strait 
of Malacca create security issues that result in inefficient policing of the waterway. 
Sovereignty considerations have prohibited participation of external powers and private 
security firms from policing the strait, leaving it vulnerable to piracy and potential 
disruption, as current policies prevent Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian law 
enforcement assets to cross into each other’s territory.41 
The expansion of ground transport by way of roads, railways, and pipelines have 
created alternate routes that limit vulnerability and port congestion by bypassing 
maritime chokepoints, but are limited in capacity compared to maritime bulk and are still 
subject to similar vulnerabilities. The fixed and linear nature of ground transport presents 
an easy target due to the difficulty in protecting thousands of miles of transport 
infrastructure.42 Development of ground transportation is often hampered by multilateral  
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coordination efforts between suppliers, transit states, and the end importers and often 
results in transit routes that are less economical in order to bypass potential belligerent 
states. 
2. Economics 
There is no single quantifiable correlation between economic growth in terms of 
GDP to energy demand, greenhouse gas emissions, and oil prices, but studies note that 
they are interrelated and vary on a country-to-country basis.43 The underlying assumption 
within existing literature is that economic development requires energy resources to 
sustain growth. Energy prices are simply driven by supply and demand in a feedback-
type system where energy commodity prices affect demand: low prices are a result of an 
oversupply relative to demand and vice versa, higher energy prices negatively affect 
demand growth and drive the development of alternative supplies, which have the 
potential to reduce the world’s market share of hydrocarbons, thus reducing dependence 
on exporter supply.44 The contemporary geopolitical environment is becoming 
increasingly globalized; the development of alternative transportation routes, 
development of additional petroleum sources, diffusion of technology and energy 
efficiency policies are examples of variables which impact global trade and degrades the 
effectiveness of energy as a tool of coercive diplomacy.45 
The precipitous change in crude prices from highs above $100 in 2012, to below 
$40 at the time of research, is due to several factors: first, a weakening global economy 
has reduced energy demand growth; secondly, increased petroleum output resulting from 
North America’s shale revolution and the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil; and finally, 
competition over market shares among producers and against alternative sources, which 
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became economical in an environment of high crude prices.46 The world’s crude oil 
supply is currently oversupplied by a production rate of approximately 2.10 million 
barrels per day (b/d) and shows no signs of immediate growth in demand or reductions in 
production in the short term.47 Price manipulation by suppliers is also a cause for 
concern, as groups like the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
and Russia’s gas consortium have the potential to leverage large market shares of 
hydrocarbon resources as a tool of coercive diplomacy or to simply raise prices, which 
their governments have become heavily dependent upon.48,49 Hydrocarbon exports 
represent a large percentage of major exporter economies, specifically the Gulf states and 
Russia, whose domestic stability is dependent upon subsidies to placate their populations: 
Yemen $200, Iran $136-$150, Libya $111, Saudi Arabia $50-$90 per barrel of crude.50 
Oil prices below these breakeven prices will result in budget deficits that have the 
potential to aggravate an already volatile region further. A concern for North America’s 
shale production is that competition over market shares has kept prices below the general 
break-even cost, but increased efficiency, new technology, new techniques, reduced 
costs, and continued external investments have prevented a dramatic decrease in U.S. 
production.51 In 2014, production costs for shale were $70 per barrel when oil prices 
averaged $115 per barrel on the market. Sub-profitable market prices, compared to 
production costs have resulted in a stagnant growth of horizontal wells and a modest 
decrease in production. The end result, however, has left the more efficient wells in 
operation, as new estimates place shale production below $30 per barrel, excluding 
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financing costs.52 Despite diminishing profit margins, continued investment and 
government policies supporting enhanced oil recovery development will potentially 
stabilize production costs between $44 and $68 per barrel by 2020.53 
Increased competition in today’s energy market is at risk of becoming 
increasingly militarized as territorial disputes challenge international norms in order to 
gain control over potentially energy-rich areas.54 Both importing and exporting nations 
are competing over market shares in order to protect their economic longevity and 
security as the world’s increasing demand reduces available export production. 
Diversifying import sources provides limited security because they are inherently 
vulnerable to physical disruptions or manipulation due to the vulnerability of the 
transportation system. By gaining control over resource production, rather than contract 
arrangements, states are able to mitigate some of the geopolitical risks associated with 
production manipulation and transportation issues, and it allows them to draw 100% of 
production, rather than settling for percentages of production. Control over production 
has limited utility in protecting states from price fluctuations in a globalized system; even 
if the United States was able to achieve energy independence, its domestic price would 
reflect that of global markets.55 Despite a decreased dependence upon energy imports 
from the Middle East, stability in the region is still vital to the world’s economy and will 
remain in the purview of Washington’s policies. 
The use of embargos and sanctions are forms of coercive diplomacy that have 
been instrumental in U.S. foreign policy in forcing compliance of belligerent states 
without necessarily using military force.56 Multilateral sanctions have been effective in 
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the past, but the increasingly globalized economic system provides alternative outlets for 
target states to minimize the effects of targeted sanctions.57 Multilateral sanctions placed 
on Angola, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Iran had limited impact upon oil output and created 
windows of opportunity for foreign investments outside of the United States and Western 
powers.58 Chinese, Indian, and Russian firms have taken advantage of sanction 
restrictions limiting Western companies’ actions inside target states by heavily investing 
in energy infrastructure, absent of competition.59,60 The dilution of sanction effectiveness 
caused by noncooperative states has a limiting effect on U.S. policy options. 
Economic interdependence is another product of globalization and is argued to be 
a factor that binds world powers together as an effective deterrent to conflict.61 
Finalization of the TPP would allow the United States to establish trade rules reflective of 
Western values and create an environment of rules-based trade, which is conducive to 
U.S. markets.62 Intellectual property rights would make it possible for developed 
countries participating in the framework to benefit the global community through 
technology sales, specifically in the field of clean energy technology. A goal of the TPP 
would be to eventually incorporate Beijing into the framework, which may be possible if 
the FTA gains enough support that not conceding to the agreement would come at an 
unacceptable economic cost to China.63 The current signatory states of both FTAs can be 
represented by the percentage of the global economy that they would encompass: the TPP 
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encompasses 37% of global GDP and excludes China, while the RCEP would encompass 
only 30% and excludes the United States.64 The TPP would allow the U.S. economy to 
grow in parity and maintain its relative advantage over China; the RCEP potentially 
reduces the salience of economic interdependence between the two powers, as Beijing 
would have established alternative outlets to facilitate economic growth. The United 
States has seen a decreasing percentage of global GDP over the last two decades, from 
30% in 1999 to 23% in 2008, and is projected to account for less than 15% by 2030; 
gaining a foothold in the fastest-growing market in the world may reverse this trend.65 
B. DETERRENTS 
1. Cyber Vulnerability 
Former Director of the National Security Agency and Director of National 
Intelligence, Mike McConnel, stated that, “the United States is fighting a cyber-war 
today, and we’re losing.”66 Studying cyber vulnerabilities in depth is outside the scope of 
this thesis, but is discussed briefly to demonstrate critical infrastructure vulnerability. A 
2009 article from the Journal of Strategic Security, suggests that China has developed a 
“cyber army” of up to 180,000 cyber spies, which has been linked to numerous cyber-
attacks throughout the world.67 
The development of a U.S. smart grid to increase the efficiency of power 
generation, transmission, and distribution to end users has been instrumental as a 
demand-side management tool for Washington.68 The growing use of computer-based 
remote controls and automation throughout the electrical system has resulted in greater 
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energy efficiency, but has simultaneously created a critical vulnerability to U.S. 
infrastructure. Automation of monitoring, metering, and distribution control of the U.S. 
electrical grid is increasingly dependent upon digital systems to function, making them 
susceptible to cyber-attacks, which was demonstrated in 2009. The 2009 attack was later 
traced back to China, and revealed software had been installed throughout the network 
which enables the China to shut down the network at a later time.69 Another example is 
the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, Pentagon cyber security expert, Sami Saydjari, noted 
that a similar mass cyber-attack on the United States could leave the country without 
power for up to six months.70 In December 2007, President Obama approved Title XIII 
of the Energy Independence and Security Act, which established a Smart Grid Task Force 
comprised of 11 federal agencies.71 Designed to streamline interagency implementation 
of policies and practices regarding further development of the smart grid, it has identified 
seven key principles for the future of the electrical grid, which includes the ability to self-
heal in the event of power disturbance events and the ability to operate resiliently against 
physical and cyber-attacks.72 Domestic policies that help manage energy demand are 
important to this thesis because they help reduce U.S. reliance on hydrocarbon imports. 
China’s demonstration of cyber capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure is cause for 
concern to policy makers and requires further study and resources to achieve system 
resilience and security. The potential for energy disruption by cyber intrusion adds a new 
dynamic to the militarization of energy security. 
Cyber espionage, which targets technical information from U.S. industries and 
federal agencies, degrades the U.S. economic advantage and compromises its military 
capabilities. The theft of intellectual property, which includes trade secrets and designs, 
makes it increasingly difficult for America to capitalize on its relative technological 
superiority when states like China are able to copy the product of R&D, while foregoing 
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the required expenses and time. James A. Lewis, the Program Director at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, describes Beijing’s cyber espionage as, “a program 
aimed at getting high-tech information and politically sensitive information- the high-tech 
information to jump-start China’s economy and the political information to ensure the 
survival of the regime.”73 The TPP would enforce an international norm of intellectual 
property rights and would enable a more integrated and competitive U.S. economy the 
Asia-Pacific region. U.S. efficiency standards and R&D have resulted in increasingly 
efficient engines, motors, batteries, and energy resource extraction techniques and 
technology, which have the potential to assist in reducing greenhouse emissions from the 
region and serve as a demand-side control that governments could use to reduce reliance 
on energy imports.74 The TPP potentially brings the Asia Pacific participants in line with 
the U.S.-led Environmental Goods Agreement in 2014, which promotes free trade of 
environmental goods.75 Theft of information relating to energy-related technology and 
the proposition of the RCEP is another example of China’s noncooperative policies. 
Cyber espionage also includes infiltration of vital military assets and theft of 
military designs, which are vital to Department of Defense (DoD) operations that provide 
security in the Middle East and freedom of navigation throughout the SLOCs. The 2009 
hack of the Joint Strike Fighter program was traced to China and enables Beijing to 
possibly copy its design and develop capabilities and tactics to counter the airframe’s 
capabilities.76 Nearly every digital and electronic military system is vulnerable to a 
cyber-attack; Chinese strategists and doctrines target this vulnerability and advocate the 
use of viruses and hackers to paralyze an enemy’s military capacity or ability to control 
its own forces in the event of a conflict.77 China has also been engaged in conducting 
field exercises in “complex electromagnetic environments,” which suggests that China 
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would employ disruptive technologies in the event of an armed conflict.78 The United 
States has developed the Air-Sea-Battle concept, which prepares U.S. and ally forces to 
operate in an environment of A2/AD in anticipation of such an attack by China.79 A2/AD 
tactics are being implemented in the Combined Task Force structure involving foreign 
militaries concentrated in the Asia-Pacific theater, the goal of which is to, “maintain 
freedom of action in the global commons, and secure operational access to enable 
concurrent or follow on joint operations.”80 The 2010 establishment of the United States 
Cyber Command allocates additional focus and resources to address the growing cyber 
threat to military operations.81 
Beijing’s aggressive actions have intensified in the twenty-first century and may 
become more emboldened as its military capabilities increase and as available energy 
resources decrease. Unclassified material does not detail America’s capability in 
countering China’s cyber threat, but doctrines focused upon operating in an A2/AD 
environment suggest that Washington has not developed a capable cyber defense. The 
United States and its allies may be prepared to operate in a restricted environment, but the 
potential for an attack on America’s electrical grid may be an unacceptable cost. 
2. Military Buildup 
Security of the SLOCs and competition over resources has developed into a 
regional arms race in the Asia-Pacific region in an attempt to enhance SLOC defense and 
power projection capabilities.82 Beijing’s land-reclamation efforts, territorial claims in 
the East and South China Seas, military modernization, and cyber capabilities have been 
specifically developed to counter U.S. military capabilities and restrict access to the 
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global commons.83 China’s policies do not explicitly express this, but acts of cyber theft, 
the 2013 establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China 
Sea, the purchase of the SS-N-22 Sunburn missile from Russia, and development of the 
Sizzler missile are specifically designed to counter U.S. Navy weaponry and defense 
systems; this potentially gives China area denial and anti-access capabilities before fully 
maturing its military.84,85,86 Based on defense expenditures and known military 
capabilities, Beijing is projected to develop a modern military capability sometime 
between 2035 and 2050.87 The disparity in power between China and rival claimants 
involved in territorial disputes make it difficult for the region’s developing countries to 
deter or resist Beijing’s pressure. Increased American presence and prioritization of 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region has helped to provide security reassurances to 
countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, who have been engaged in aggravated 
skirmishes with China over territorial claims. The “deepening bonds” section in the NSS 
and Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 
includes a list of U.S. collective defense arrangement states, as well as others regional 
powers: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Bangladesh, and Burma.88,89 Enhancing 
relations throughout the region enables regional actors to draw upon America’s superior 
conventional strength to deter Chinese aggression. The risk of an aggravated encounter 
between Beijing and a mutual defense ally over resources has the potential to result in 
armed conflict between China and the United States. Cooperation with regional states 
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enhances Washington’s ability to enforce international norms and also assists with 
finalizing the TPP. Asia’s growing market is projected to account for half of the world’s 
economic output by 2025; thus, exclusion from a regional FTA would be detrimental to 
America’s economic prosperity.90 
The DoD is currently facing a period of increased fiscal uncertainty, as the 2011 
Budget Control Act has resulted in a military drawdown across the armed services and 
has forced the Joint Chiefs to prioritize modernization projects to shape the future force 
structure.91 The risk of a future reduction in force size and capabilities is dependent upon 
future fiscal constraints, which are jeopardizing Washington’s deterrent credibility.92 
Figure 1 illustrates regional trends in military expenditures in millions of dollars spent 
per year and is based on regional actors relevant to this thesis, with military expenditures 
of at least $25 billion to show relative military expenditures in U.S. dollar equivalents. 
Despite a reduction in military expenditures, the United States remains the world’s 
dominant fighting force. Beijing’s aggressive actions have led to the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations inviting Washington into the region to deter Chinese diplomatic, 
economic, and military force.93 Deviation from the traditional two-war force size 
construct may make it increasingly difficult for Washington to maintain sufficient forces 
in the Asia-Pacific region in the event of a military conflict.94 
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Figure 1.  Regional military expenditure in $billions  
Adapted from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data.95 
C. COOPERATION 
Appealing to common interests, leveraging relative strengths, and economic 
interdependence have the potential to incentivize cooperation between China and the 
United States Climate change and antipiracy operations have been areas of cooperation 
between the two nations and proves that the capacity to cooperate exists. Two things are 
certain in the coming years: first, Middle Eastern oil will remain vital to the global 
economy despite America’s increased production; and second, Middle Eastern oil is a 
vital ingredient to China’s aspirations.96,97 Stability in the Middle East and continued 
access to its hydrocarbon resources is a priority for both powers, which could potentially 
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lead to a cooperative security arrangement. Cooperation between China and America may 
be limited to a few examples, but they are instrumental in reducing the potential for 
misunderstanding, confrontation, and conflict.98 
1. Climate Change
Climate change has been gaining attention in recent years due its effect upon the 
physical environment, which led to the development of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol.99 These treaties provide a legally 
binding framework requiring industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and assist developing nations in implementing clean technology in 
order to limit global temperature increases to two degrees Celsius by 2020.100 The energy 
sector produces 60% of the world’s GHG emissions, presenting a difficult problem set in 
a world of increasing energy demand. In order to reduce global emissions, policies and 
infrastructure must transition to cleaner technologies while simultaneously satisfying 
electricity generation requirements.101 Despite international efforts, 60% of new power 
production from 2001 to 2011 came from lower efficiency, subcritical, coal-fired 
generation plants; a trend that, if continued, will close the two-degree goal by 2017, and 
require a three-year period of zero-emission developments in order to not exceed GHG 
output levels.102 Temperature increases have accelerated the rate of urbanization, which 
is generating increased demands to offset adverse weather changes through heating and 
98 Kris Michaud, Joe Buccino, and Stephen Chenelle, “The Impact of Domestic Shale Oil Production 
on U.S. Military Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.-China Maritime Partnership,” Small Wars Journal, 
March 14, 2014, 6, accessed August 5, 2015, smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/15408. 
99 Pragya Jaswal and Mitali Gupta, “Energy Demands and Sustaining Growth in South and East Asia 
Energy Demands and Sustaining Growth in South and East Asia,” ResearchGate, March 2006, 24, accessed 
October 30, 2015, 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265004378_Energy_Demands_and_Sustaining_Growth_in_South
_and_East_Asia_Energy_Demands_and_Sustaining_Growth_in_South_and_East_Asia_1. 
100 “UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol,” United Nations, 1, accessed January 5, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/the-un-climate-change-
convention-and-the-kyoto-protocol. 
101 Liwayway Adkins et al., “Energy, Climate Change & Environment: 2014 Insights,” International 
Energy Agency, 2014, 9, accessed January 5, 2015, 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EECC2014.pdf. 
102 Ibid., 15. 
 27
air conditioning.103,104 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that 
the Arctic could hold up to 22% of the world’s undiscovered conventional gas reserves 
and melt rates suggest that the area would be accessible for 110 days out of the year by 
2030.105 Increased access to potential undeveloped energy reserves could result in 
territorial disputes mirroring those in the Asia-Pacific region.106 
Policy promoting energy efficiency is one of the effective ways to meet GHG 
emission goals.107 Pollution charges, tradable permits, and elimination of government 
subsidy programs are examples of market-based instruments that incentivize transition 
toward cleaner and more efficient technologies.108 Penalizing higher carbon emission 
electricity generation through direct taxes and incentivizing lower emissions by allowing 
sell-off of surplus carbon allowances to other firms, helps cleaner technology stay 
competitive in an environment of low-cost hydrocarbons. In order to meet the two-degree 
goal by 2020, changes must be made to existing infrastructure by way of retiring the 
world’s least-efficient coal plants, retrofitting less-efficient coal plants, and retrofitting 
compatible coal plants with CCS.109 These changes would have to occur at a rate 
requiring modifications or closures to occur before the end of a plant’s planned lifetime, 
without degrading available electricity production below demand.110 Climate change has 
resulted in a cooperative relationship between Washington and Beijing; both 
governments have worked together to produce policies and statements aimed at achieving 
post-2020 climate change targets.111 The effects of climate change on the environment 
will exacerbate demand growth and create urgency to gain energy resources. Climate-
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change management efforts have the potential to incentivize diversification of energy 
mixes to less hydrocarbon-dependent infrastructure in electricity generation and have the 
added benefit of reducing hydrocarbon dependence and GHG emissions. 
There are a wide range of variables concerning energy security and its impact on 
state decisions. It is difficult to factor each of them equally, but it is worth noting their 
strengths and weaknesses in order to demonstrate that there is an effect on the decision-
making process. Global concern for climate change has the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions through cooperation and technology-sharing, which would simultaneously 
have the effect of reducing demand, and thus dependence, on hydrocarbon imports. This 
would be true in a stagnant world, but population growth and growing economies are 
generating demand beyond the world’s production capacity. This is generally true, but 
due to increased North American production, Iran’s reintroduction into the market, and 
the global economic slowdown, there is a surplus in global production. Despite there 
being more than enough oil on the market to answer demands, competition over resources 
in the Asia-Pacific region remains. The only mechanism to diplomatically settle territorial 
disputes regarding legal rights to resources is based on adherence to international rules 
and norms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Getting 
Beijing to concede to international demands to withdraw its excessive claims in the East 
and South China Seas, in accordance with the UNCLOS framework, would enable such a 
process to occur in the Arctic once it becomes more accessible, rather than presenting 
another tense geographic area. Economic interdependence and deterrence seem to be the 
limiting variables regarding a conflict between U.S. and Chinese forces, but an incident 
involving commercial and law enforcement assets may go beyond the intentions of both 
governments and result in conflict. In addition to competition over resources, Beijing is 
developing a logistical chain of bases along the SLOCs, spanning from the Indian Ocean 
into Asia, either out of fear of being denied access to resources or in an attempt to control 
the SLOCs itself. Losing access to the resource flow through the SLOCs is an 
unacceptable outcome for the global economy; any attempt to block or manipulate this 
resource will likely result in conflict. 
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D. EXISTING LITERATURE 
President Obama’s November 2011 statement, “Asia will largely define whether 
the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human 
progress,” aligns with the conclusions of many scholars and analysts.112 The consensus 
among many scholars is that short of cooperation, conflict will result from competition 
over energy resources in the Asia-Pacific region, while others argue that there are 
sufficient stabilizing variables that will prevent conflict from emerging. Comparing these 
views with Aaron L. Friedberg’s, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict 
Inevitable?” will add international relations insight for both scenarios. Friedberg is a 
practiced politician, serving on the White House staff from 2003 to 2005, and is a 
respected authority on U.S.-Chinese relations. 
Predictors of conflict gravitate toward elements of strategic vulnerability, 
expanding interests, increased military capabilities, and U.S. presence in the region as 
main drivers of conflict between the Beijing and Washington. Ji Guoxin, a Chinese 
academic, argues that energy deficiency throughout the Asia-Pacific region will result in 
conflict in the event of SLOCs’ restriction or access denial to regional supplies or flow of 
resources.113 Leverett Flynt, a former National Security Council member and academic, 
adds that China’s growing power has enabled it to exercise influence throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region in ways that could lead to competition over control of the 
SLOCs.114,115 Friedburg explains, through the lens of realist pessimists, that a 
combination of China’s rising power, expanding aims, and the evolving tensions in the 
region could lead to conflict.116 Following the historical example of rising powers 
conflicting with the status-quo, he elaborates that China is no different and hints about 
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elements of increased latent power and the eventual transition to a capable military 
enabling Beijing’s leadership to expand and pursue its national interests, “challenge 
territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige 
that were put in place when they were relatively weak.”117 In this case, control of the 
SLOCs or the threat of being denied access to the SLOCs will likely result in conflict. 
Salameh Mamdough, an international oil economist, concludes that the issue lies in 
China’s approach to energy security being geostrategic, rather than geoeconomic. A 
greater emphasis on domestic policies, infrastructure, and investments that would 
increase efficiency, diversify supplies, and reduce demand could reduce Beijing’s 
dependence upon the transit of energy resources through the SLOCs and reduce the 
probability of conflict.118 Liberal pessimists would argue that this is due to the nature of 
China’s authoritarian regime, conflicting policies, and differences between Communist 
and Democratic governments.119 It is not likely that China’s government will change, nor 
will its policies, putting it at odds with the United States in a cycle of “mutually 
reinforcing suspicions and fears,” that could lead to conflict.120 The Global Trends 2030 
report, a publication of the National Intelligence Council, concludes that conflict is likely 
due to the lack of a regional security framework that enables arbitration.121 The 
UNCLOS provides a process for settling disputes concerning territorial claims, but 
Washington’s absence from the agreement makes it difficult to enforce an international 
norm that it has not ratified. Inhan Kim, a political scientist, argues that Beijing’s 
aggression is due to the perceived threat of U.S. containment, whose presence and 
policies are creating tension that could lead to conflict.122 Through the constructivist 
pessimist lens, Thomas Burger adds that, “the chief source of instability in [Asia] today 
lies in the peculiar construction of national identity and interests on the part of the chief 
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regional actors.”123 It is due to these biased images of each other that trust and 
cooperation cannot be reached, even in areas of common interest.124 
Taking the contrary view, other scholars believe that there are sufficient 
stabilizing variables that have prevented, and will continue to prevent, conflict. There is a 
common theme among optimists focusing on economic interdependence, international 
institutions, and the possibility of a democratic China all being factors which will 
continue to prevent conflict. Robert Sutter, an expert on U.S. policy toward the Asia-
Pacific region, argues that continued relations will come short of conflict between China 
and the United States because both countries are growing increasingly interdependent, are 
preoccupied with domestic issues, and fear the prospect of mutual devastation.125 Liberal 
optimists tend to agree that economic interdependence “creates shared interests in good 
relations between states,” which will ultimately preserve peace and avoid conflict.126 
Liberal optimists also suggest that the increasing number of international institutions that 
both Washington and Beijing are members of will “improve communication between 
states, reducing uncertainty about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments 
to make credible, binding commitments to one another.”127 The biggest argument that 
liberal optimists make is that China is undergoing domestic changes reflective of the 
nascent stages of democratization, but it depends upon continued economic growth.128 
Russett and O’Neal’s democratic peace theory suggests that a democratic China would 
not be inclined to fight the United States.129 Bruce Jones, the vice president and director 
of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institute, offers an interesting view that 
Beijing realizes how dependent it is on U.S. security operations, specifically in the 
Middle East, and has expressed no desire to participate in security operations in the 
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region.130 Realist optimists acknowledge China’s growing power, but note that China 
will likely remain limited in aim and scope. Finally, realist optimists suggest the 
emergence of a bipolar system in Asia as Beijing’s power continues to grow and create a 
“tense, but basically stable” environment.131 As a result of increased U.S. production, 
Washington’s policy options potentially include reducing its presence in the Middle East 
which would potentially illicit increased investments by China in securing access to 
resources from the region; by leveraging security of the Middle East, the United States 
may be in a position to engage in a more cooperative security arrangement.132,133 
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III. UPDATING THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
A. CHOKEPOINTS 
The EIA estimates that approximately 63% of the world’s oil was transported 
along maritime routes in 2013.134 Statistics like this highlight the global economy’s need 
for and dependence upon maritime transport and the uninterrupted flow of commerce 
through strategic chokepoints. The physical characteristics of these key chokepoints limit 
the capacity that they can accommodate. Thus, as demand grows in Asia, the importance 
of areas like the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz increases. Traffic through these 
chokepoints carry oil from the Middle East to the Asian-Pacific area, where the demand 
for energy and goods overtook that of North America and Europe combined in 2010.135 
Any disruption to the flow of oil through these chokepoints could have potentially 
devastating effects on the global economy. There is a long history of states using the 
denial of territorial waters during conflicts or periods of increased tension between  
states; piracy and terrorism are the most likely means of disrupting the shipping system, 
because they are borderless organizations or cells that are difficult respond to with 
conventional force. The use of asymmetrical warfare, in the form of mines and 
improvised underwater explosives, is relatively cheap and results in physical destruction, 
as well as psychological effects. Issues of sovereignty, military policy, and the emergence 
of private security firms pose a series of overlapping and conflicting frameworks that 
hamper states’ ability to secure these vital resources. The reality of the U.S. military’s 
downsizing and the emergence of China as a growing global power offer an arena that 
could provide a cooperative rebalancing of security responsibilities in the Asian-Pacific 
region to ensure the security of global trade and energy security. The takeaway is that the 
global economy is dependent upon the uninterrupted transport of commercial goods and 
petroleum, and chokepoints provide a strategic point by which states, terrorists, and 
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pirates can potentially disrupt this chain and could cause catastrophic damage; these 
strategic points also overlap territorial waters, where sovereignty becomes an issue when 
outside forces attempt to provide security for the global good. 
Discussing geographical constraints imposed upon several chokepoints ignores 
the implication of bordering country policies imposed on the region and will be covered 
later in this section.  
The Straits of Malacca connect the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, 
facilitating about 60,000 vessels annually; 20,000 of which are petroleum tankers from 
the Middle East.136,137  At its most constrained point, it is 70-feet deep and 2.5-km wide. 
The closest alternative to this route is through the Strait of Sunda.138 The fact that such a 
large volume of China’s imports, specifically oil, transits through this chokepoint, gives it 
the potential to be a single point of failure for China’s economy and its ability to meet its 
energy needs. The Strait of Hormuz links the oilfields of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of 
Oman, and the Indian Ocean; while it is not as constrained geographically as the Strait of 
Malacca, traffic is limited to a 6-km-wide channel. Alternatives to the strait rely heavily 
upon pipelines throughout the region, but they are limited in capacity; a 2012 IEA 
estimate indicated that the Strait of Hormuz was a chokepoint for 20% of the world’s 
exported oil.139 Two other strategic locations worth mentioning are the Gulf of Aden and 
the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal is vital to Egypt’s economy, as it is unidirectional and 
limited to several convoys per day. It also accounts for approximately $5 billion in 
revenue annually and bypassing this canal would require a 6,500-km detour around 
Africa. Twenty percent of the world’s transported commerce passes through the Gulf of 
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Aden and 12% of the world’s oil. Studying the challenges posed by piracy in the region is 
useful in demonstrating maritime shipping’s vulnerability to piracy.140 
These locations become strategic points in the global economy; they become 
resources and points that can be controlled to leverage other countries, or manipulated to 
favor some countries over others. State-sponsored blockages or denial of use have been 
used in the past, but often elicit a global response and pressure to reopen these points. 
Piracy poses a minor disruption in the relative scope of volume distributed, but poses an 
economic impact in the form of minor delays and ransoms. Piracy is useful in 
highlighting the physical vulnerabilities of maritime shipping, as well as policy issues in 
terms of multinational cooperation. Terrorism poses the greatest threat to the maritime 
transportation system. Gaps in policy and contentions between regional actors and global 
powers limit the ability of outside and more capable powers, private or national, to ensure 
the security of such a vital lifeline. In 1956, Egypt sank ships inside the Suez Canal, 
effectively closing it until 1957, and again in the 60s, during the Six-Day War against 
Israel, it remained closed from 1967 to 1975.141 Accommodating over 60% of the 
world’s oil transportation, a closure or delay of the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca would 
have crippling effects on commerce, as well as the world’s ability to meet its energy 
needs; a state-sponsored closure of one or both of these passages would draw the 
attention of the powers at hand.142 The U.S. shale revolution has played a role in 
reducing America’s dependence upon Middle Eastern oil and will play a part in future 
policy considerations, while many Asian countries are growing more dependent upon the 
uninterrupted flow of relatively cheap resources. An example of the cost differential 
between transporting oil through piping to circumvent a blocked passage can be 
demonstrated that oil shipped using the Baku-Deyhan pipeline averages an increase of 
between $1 and $2 per barrel, while transport by tanker through the Black Sea accounts 
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for $2 per barrel; with economies of scale being favorable, this amounts to considerable 
amounts of money and would still be limited to the capacity of alternate routes.143 
Piracy throughout the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first century, has 
been of growing concern to policy makers and governments. In addressing this specific 
security concern, the politics involved in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca 
result in a system that non-cooperative in security operations across sovereign 
boundaries. Refusal to accommodating external security services has resulted in an 
inefficient security system. While regional actors manage to simply allow or luckily 
manage the flow of commerce, they have not met the increased security needs of 
maritime transport through strategic waters that fall within their jurisdiction. Regional 
instability, poverty, and population marginalization, have empowered groups like Jamaah 
Islamiyah and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka increasing the potential threat terrorism poses to 
the Strait of Malacca; from 2002 to 2007, the region reported over 128 reported hit-and-
run style robberies.144 Attempts at establishing multilateral security arrangements in the 
Strait of Malacca took place in 2004 with the 2004 trilateral MALSINDO and 2006 Eyes 
in the Sky (EIS) programs form the Malacca Strait Patrol Network, but has been 
criticized as lacking sufficient resources and cooperation between the Singaporean, 
Indonesian, and Malaysian governments.145 Surveillance planes aircraft under EIS are 
authorized to patrol into neighboring territories by three miles, while surface vessels are 
restricted to their respective countries territorial waters.146 There is a general lack of 
coordination between the few actual patrols and hand offs between the EIS and surface 
assets in pursuit, as well as pursuits that cross into neighboring waters.147  
In 2004, the Indonesian government vetoed an effort to place a U.S. military 
presence directly in the Strait of Malacca to help facilitate security and patrols. Malaysian 
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Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi responded by stating, “I think we can look after 
our own area.”148 As a failed state, Somalia has housed a pirate epidemic that plagues the 
Gulf of Aden’s merchants to the point that the United Nations passed Security 
Resolutions 1651 and 1846, condemning acts of piracy and allows the pursuit of pirates 
into Somali waters.149 In 2009, the U.S. established the Combined Task Force (CTF) 
151, which encountered over one thousand pirates, apprehended 432, and destroyed 
76 vessels within 600 days of establishment.150 Differences in rules of engagement 
between the countries comprising CTF 151 has resulted in several documented instances 
where Canadian and British forces gave food and water to pirates after disarming them, 
throwing their ladders into the water, and releasing them, while another example involves 
Russian forces releasing pirates by putting them in an inflatable life raft with no supplies 
or means of propulsion.151 Differences in operating procedures and the unwillingness of 
governments to cooperate with each other, and/or the United States, have limited existing 
efforts at maritime security in this region. 
The persistence of piracy and the events of 9/11 have caused an increase in 
private security firms that offer services ranging from training, harbor security 
evaluations, harbor security, and armed security teams that ride onboard ships as armed 
escorts. The issue of armed personnel onboard civilian ships has typically been against 
what is considered a norm, and regulations of many countries prohibit the presence of 
firearms onboard vessels flying their flags. This technicality is often bypassed by hiring 
armed escorts that follow in transport ships. International regulations are less constrictive 
on the open seas, but within sovereign waters, ships must abide by local rules and 
regulations. Private security in the Strait of Malacca went fairly unnoticed until a 2005 
article depicted foreign militaries using weapons for security within regional waters of 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which was viewed as a challenge to the region’s 
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“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”152 Outside of providing training and 
technology to monitor the Strait, regional actors have not allowed any potential 
challenges to their sovereignty. Interviews of security firm personnel reveal instances of 
national navies accepting jobs to be contracted as security escorts through the Strait of 
Malacca, highlighting the malleability of the region’s security forces.153  
There needs to be a collective effort in which these regional actors shape future 
policy with clear guidelines that allow the use of armed security teams and escorts to 
complement their own existing forces. Territorial disputes and pursuits into neighboring 
waters may take more time to delineate with codified regulations, but allowing security 
teams under innocent passage and additional regulations should allow armed teams to 
respond in self-defense. For example, U.S. Navy vessels transiting regions such as the 
Strait of Malacca fall under innocent passage, but are exempt from restrictions due to 
being classified as warships. The benefit of added security for a relatively low cost may 
be hard for the international community to comprehend proactively, but they would likely 
be responsive to the economic impact of a strait closure or delay. 
The concern with terrorism is that ships can be seized, their cargo confiscated 
(chemicals, weapons, and documents), and ultimately be used to block or disrupt these 
chokepoints. Other scenarios include shutting down ports directly with dirty bombs, or 
scuttling ships at access points. One 2002 simulation estimated that the complete 
shutdown of American seaports for 12 days would result in a loss of over $58 billion and 
the closure of 29 seaports on the West Coast for two weeks would cost about half a 
billion dollars.154 Targeting ports or merchants directly would have limited effect, 
whereas targeting a point upon which most of the world’s trade commutes would affect 
the entire system, and the effects would be felt throughout the world. Statements by 
Osama Bin Laden, and documents seized following his death, revealed plans and policies 
of attrition centered on “bleeding” the United States and its allies’ economies to 
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bankruptcy by targeting maritime transportation and infrastructure.155 The suicide 
bombing of MV Limburg in 2002 is credited with temporarily increasing the cost of oil 
by $0.48 a barrel, and resulted in a 93% drop of container terminal use throughout 
Yemen.156 The following statement by Bin Laden captures the reality of the terrorist 
threat to maritime security and the global economy, “if a boat that didn’t cost $1,000 
managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude, so imagine the extent of danger that 
threatens the West’s commercial lifeline.”157 The most likely and threatening mode of 
achieving system disruption would likely come in the form of underwater mines or using 
improvised underwater explosives to deny access and/or block strategic chokepoints. The 
psychological and physical damage that could ensue from mining such waters would 
undoubtedly cause significant, time-consuming delays and blockages. 
Mines have been used since the American Civil War and they present a weapon 
that is relatively cheap and can be deployed by air, surface vessels, swimmers, and 
submarines. Moreover, mines have been proven throughout history to be extremely 
effective weapons in denying access to strategic waters. Terrorists have demonstrated 
their ingenuity through their extensive use of improvised explosive devices, and it is not 
difficult to imagine them applying the same capacity to developing improvised 
underwater explosive devices (IUEDs).  
The United States deployed more than 25,000 mines along Japanese shipping 
routes in 1945, sinking 700 and damaging many more vessels.158 In addition to the 
unrestricted submarine campaign against Japan in World War II, the use of mines 
effectively ceased all commerce into and around Japan; following hostilities, it took 
considerable resources and time for U.S. forces to clear the minefields.159 The United 
States was humiliated in the Korean War, where a siege of Wonsan was blocked by 3,000 
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mines, causing Task Force Commander Rear Admiral Allen E. “Hoke” Smith to retort, 
“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-WWI weapons . . .  
laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”160 Libyan naval 
personnel mined the Red Sea/Gulf of Suez for two weeks from a commercial ferry, the 
Ghai, in 1984, without being challenged, damaging 23 vessels.161 All of these scenarios 
illustrate the ease by which mines can be deployed, their effectiveness in disrupting 
shipping, and the extensive resources and time required to render waters safe for passage 
again. Mines come in various types and IUEDs can be easily constructed—and both are 
cheap to produce or procure. An organized attack on several of the high-traffic 
chokepoints would require shipping to be diverted and/or stopped until resources are 
dispatched to begin the time-consuming process of hunting and sweeping for mines. The 
task of demining several areas would stretch the limited resources of coalition forces, 
further delaying clearance of passageways. Physical damage, which could sink ships in 
these chokepoints, would further complicate and overwhelm forces. The gaps in a 
seamless system between private security firms, regional actors, and global powers are 
exploited by pirates and can also be exploited by terrorists. 
American military policy has been more or less tied to the security of oil, 
expressed in the Carter Doctrine and manifested in the U.S. military operations in the 
Middle East, all of which partially occurred in response to the effects of the 1973 Arab 
oil embargo. Today, the United States is less dependent upon oil from the Middle East 
and credit can be given to the growing development and implementation of renewables, 
the shale gas revolution, and technologies that target efficiency to reduce energy 
consumption. U.S. production has reached parity and/or surpassed that of Saudi Arabia 
and Russia in production capacity and is projected to become a net exporter by 2030.162 
This reduced reliance upon Middle Eastern oil gives the United States more leverage in 
dealing with the region and reduces its dependence upon the Straits of Hormuz and 
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Malacca. China’s development, on the other hand, has outgrown its domestic oil 
production; thus, growing more dependent upon these strategic points to fuel its 
economy.163 
China is aware of this dependence and has responded with doctrines that shift 
from strictly homeland protection to include trade as a principal national concern.164 How 
China plans to increase its security is a matter for concern in the Asia-Pacific region. 
While they are not official statements, Chinese publications have been cited with 
statements from scholars and some officials that identify the Strait of Malacca as China’s 
oil lifeline and that whoever controls this resource can threaten China’s energy security at 
any time. Other statements describe the United States as viewing the entire world as 
“terrorists” and that the continued presence of the United States within the region is an 
excuse to hinder Chinese naval ambitions.165 If popular opinion in China is along these 
lines, the potential for conflict exponentially increases once China’s Navy matures into a 
“Blue Water Navy” and they are able to forcefully engage in ensuring their interests. 
Beijing’s growing dependence upon the SLOCs and America’s decreasing 
dependence upon them have the potential to motivate a cooperative effort to secure the 
global economy from threats of terrorism proactively, rather than reactively. U.S. military 
assets are stretched thin between the Middle East and the Pacific region, and this strain on 
its military resources is exacerbated by shrinking budgets and security gaps within the 
Strait of Malacca. In terms of its mining fleet, the United States has 14 MCM-1 Avenger-
class ships in its inventory, four are stationed in the Arabian Gulf, two are stationed in 
Japan, and eight are stateside. It only has 28 remaining MH-53E Sea dragons left in its 
inventory, and both frames are the Navy’s primary means of antimine warfare.166 The 
amount of time it would take for the U.S. military to simultaneously hunt and sweep 
mines or IUEDs in multiple locations would be insufficient to prevent a global economic 
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impact. Serving mutual interests, the severity of this threat may be enough to facilitate a 
cooperative system between the two major powers, the United States and China. While 
China lacks the ability to control waters outside of its coastal region, it is the most 
opportune time for Washington to engage in bilateral agreements to demonstrate the 
feasibility of a shared role of securing the region. 
The global economy is dependent upon the flow of goods and oil throughout the 
world. The use of maritime shipping accounts for the majority of exported oil and the 
concentration of shipping through chokepoints leaves this vital source of commerce 
extremely vulnerable. Noncooperative policies in the Strait of Malacca and differences in 
rules of engagement and operating procedures between coalition forces leaves an 
uncoordinated system that could be described as reactive rather than proactive.  
In the post-9/11 era, the threat of terrorism has been realized and is ever prevalent. 
Chokepoints along maritime routes are extremely vulnerable and there is documented 
evidence confirming that terrorist organizations and pirates have targeted this 
infrastructure. The prevalence of piracy in these areas demonstrates the vulnerability of 
maritime transport. Mines present the most feasible and likely means to cause and 
adequate disruption in the world’s trade system and result in an economic crisis. 
Countries within the Asia-Pacific region are at greater risk because of their dependence 
upon imported energy sources, requiring them to draw upon their reserves and/or share 
resources according to existing treaties. The emergence of private security firms pose a 
feasible means of hardening vessels against attacks and hijacking, and alleviating the 
drain on military resources throughout the world; but, policy restrictions within territorial 
waters prevent this potential from manifesting. The solution lies in a proactive approach 
toward this system failure. Cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore is 
necessary, and resulting policies should incorporate the added benefit of private security 
usage, paid for by corporations. The U.S. pivot to the Pacific could help foster 
cooperation and greater interoperability between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
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B. CHINA/CENTRAL ASIA/UNITED STATES 
Contemporary energy markets are challenged by the unprecedented economic 
growth in Asia, specifically in China and India. Growing pains have strained the world’s 
larger economies by their inability to develop sufficient domestic energy supply to keep 
pace with rapid economic growth. This study will focus on China, as it is slightly more 
developed than India and more active in its attempts to influence the geopolitics of 
Eurasia. China’s actions and developments challenge the status quo and have the 
potential to marginalize U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This thesis will 
demonstrate China’s dependence upon imported energy and how this dependence has 
influenced its foreign policy in developing preferential trade agreements with global 
producers of energy commodities. A brief discussion on China’s natural resources, 
domestic production capability, future plans, and energy mix will help demonstrate 
China’s necessity for imported energy sources. This growing dependence upon imported 
energy leaves China increasingly vulnerable to coercive energy policies, as experienced 
by the Japanese in World War II under the U.S. oil embargo, the United States by the 
1973 Arab oil embargo, and Russia’s post-Cold War evolving relationship with Europe 
regarding gas supplies. To mitigate the possibility of a disruption in their energy supply, 
Beijing has spent nearly $2 trillion in this decade on their defense budget.167 The 
exclusionary tone of RCEP and its opposition to the U.S.-led TPP, combined with its 
military expansion and developments in the South China Sea, are cause for concern. 
Lastly, this section will discuss the U.S. policy shift to the Pacific with regard to China’s 
development. 
China’s economic growth has afforded it the means to develop a robust military. 
This fast economic growth has had the unintended consequence of increasing its energy 
needs in order to sustain its economic force and, in turn, its military. These developments 
have led Beijing to become the largest energy consumer and producer in the world, and 
the disparity between their consumption and their production capabilities is growing. In 
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order to supplement its production capacity, China became the world’s largest importer 
of petroleum and petroleum products in the world, surpassing the United States at the end 
of 2013.168 Beijing accounted for 43% of the world’s oil consumption growth in 2014, 
and is projected to account for a quarter of global consumption growth through 2015.169 
Estimates in 2015 indicate that China’s proven oil reserves are approximately 24.6 billion 
barrels and that Beijing has become one of the top oil producers in the world; in the past 
20 years alone, domestic capacity has increased by 50%.170 While its domestic capacity 
has increased, it has plateaued and will see relatively little increase compared to demand 
projections. In 2014, Beijing was able to produce 4.6 million b/d, but consumed 10.7 
million b/d, requiring it to import more than half of its petroleum supply.  
The term “energy mix” is used to describe the combination of energy 
commodities that a country uses to answer its needs. Petroleum in this case, only 
accounted for 20% of the world’s energy generated in 2012.171 For the rest of its energy 
requirements, China has turned to resources within their control. After discussing the 
mixture used by Beijing, this section will discuss the different technologies and sources 
that are being used for conventional electricity generation to slow the increase of 
petroleum demand. 
According to the IEA, “China is the world’s top coal producer, consumer, and 
importer, and importer and accounts for almost half of global coal consumption.”172 
Unlike its petroleum deposits, there are substantial amounts of coal within its borders. 
The problem with coal is that it is not as easy to transport as gas or petroleum, limiting its 
application. It is limited to fueling traditional, coal-powered plants, which are considered 
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“dirty” technology due to GHG emissions and have recently become a concern for policy 
makers. In 2012, coal accounted for 66% of Beijing’s energy mix, but efforts have been 
made in an attempt to cap its contribution to the mix at 62% by 2020.173 Petroleum and 
liquids accounted for 20%, hydroelectricity 8%, natural gas 5%, and nuclear 1%.174 
Growing demand for petroleum is specific to motor vehicle use and, as the country’s 
middle class benefits from China’s increased GDP, a larger number of vehicles on the 
road create a growing demand for petroleum, rather than for coal, hydroelectric, or 
nuclear energy resources. Efforts have been made to limit petroleum’s use in 
conventional power production and the implementation of efficiency and emissions 
standards are being used to answer the cuts in petroleum and coal use in China’s 
traditional energy mix. Future plans are to increase the use of natural gas to replace 
petroleum and coal reduction and limits.175 To further decrease the strain on domestic 
energy markets and help lessen its dependence upon foreign oil, China plans on 
constructing 20 more nuclear power plants by 2020, bringing the nuclear portion of its 
energy mix from 2% to 15% by 2035.176 Domestic development will have limited 
success in providing Beijing with a secure source of energy. To help facilitate China’s 
outward search for petroleum and gas, it created three national oil and gas companies in 
the 1980s: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC).177 While the liberalization of China’s economic policies have opened up 
private enterprises, a majority of investments and infrastructure development occurs 
through these nationalized oil companies (NOCs). China’s growing dependency upon 
imported energy has resulted in the development of bilateral trade agreements and 
infrastructure development by these NOCs. While these agreements and investments 
primarily target geographically convenient countries for their transport and resource 
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potential, China has also sought deals with nearly every energy resource producing 
nation. Foreign oil imports from major regions are as follows: Middle East 52%, Africa 
22%, Americas 11%, Russia 13%, and the Asia-Pacific 2%.178  
Regional stability has therefore become ingrained within China’s foreign policies. 
As demonstrated with Sudan, South Sudan, and Iran, regional issues and sanctions 
resulted in reduced or no flow of oil from these countries to China and required Beijing to 
seek relations with the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iraq, Angola, Venezuela, and 
Russia to prevent an actual shortage.179 While energy commodities are the focus of this 
section, the routes and infrastructure developed to transport these commodities also help 
facilitate trade. With this in mind, geopolitics has helped China develop its autonomous 
region, Xinjiang, in order to promote stability. Secessionist rhetoric and unrest by the 
region’s Uyghur population potentially threatens China’s second-largest energy 
producing region, representing 19% of total production, within its borders.180 A 2000 
census indicates that 45% of this region’s population are Uyghurs, but they only represent 
approximately half of China’s total Muslim population.181 An American international 
relations scholar, Monica Duffy Toft, provides a model of four physical distributions of 
ethnic groups and their capability for or risk of successfully separating from a state places 
a low probability of success in this case.182 While the total Uyghur population represents 
a minority in China, their presence in the energy-rich region and its proximity to Central 
Asian energy resources makes ensuring stability within the region a priority. By reducing 
the perception of regional marginalization and uneven distribution of resources to 
Xinjiang, Beijing will help reduce the salience of ethnic division in secessionist 
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movements.183 The revised total GDP of China in 2013 was $9.4 trillion and the total 
trade with Central Asia only accounted for $50 billion of the total.184 ,185 Of the $50 
billion of trade with Central Asia, 80% was through the Xinjiang province.186 The 
infrastructure and trade developments through Central Asia, vis-á-vis the “March 
Westward” and the Silk Road Economic Belt, have the benefit of increasing trade in 
Xinjiang, but more importantly grant they access to Central Asia’s energy resources and 
transportation routes. Of note, China has recently been identified as having the world’s 
largest shale gas deposits discovered to date.187 
The Sudan, South Sudan, and Iran examples demonstrate the vulnerability of 
China’s reliance on substantial volumes of oil and gas from unstable regions of the  
world. To help curb this vulnerability, the NOCs have developed a diversified number of 
sources to limit the impact of regional instability on its energy supplies. Recent 
discoveries of energy deposits within Central Asia place the Caspian Sea Basin at  
18.8% (approximately 2%–3%, excluding Russia) of the world’s proven oil reserves and 
45% (approximately 4%–5%, excluding Russia) of its total gas reserves.188,189 When 
referencing the Caspian Sea Basin for its energy resources, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia are generally associated with energy markets.  
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Since the early 1990s, foreign investment into the region came with the formation 
of the Caspian Basin Consortium, which has predominately served European markets.190 
Due to Central Asia’s geographical proximity to China, additional infrastructure to the 
world’s leading consumer and overall integration into a vast transportation system would 
help facilitate a free oil market. An alternative to the Trans-Siberian transportation route 
and integration into the international markets will have a beneficial effect on the region’s 
overall economic health. While there are other resources deposited throughout the region, 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has left these states vying to solidify their sovereignty 
and bolster their economies, while, collectively, they represent a strategic supply of 
energy reserves. Other land-locked Central Asian states, which do not have energy 
resources of significance, become important to this research for their use of transportation 
infrastructure. An unintended consequence, and benefit, to Asia is that by developing 
new infrastructure and integrating the region through various pipeline projects, a second 
Eurasian land bridge has given an alternative outlet to these former Soviet states, helping 
to reduce Russia’s footprint throughout the greater Eurasian area. Beijing’s current five-
year plan seeks to limit oil imports to no more than 61% of its total supply by the end of 
2015.191 As early as 1997, Beijing pledged over $10 billion in investments, primarily in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for energy-related infrastructure 
development.192 
Besides its energy resources, Kazakhstan also serves as a transit state, connecting 
China to Azerbaijan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.193 Chinese 
investment in Kazakhstan’s energy resources came as early as 1997, when CNPC 
purchased a 60% share of Aktobemunaigaz for $4.3 billion and won a contract that same 
year for a controlling interest in Uzen, the second-largest oil field in the country.194 The 
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transnational Kazakhstan Russian oil pipeline was a 2006 joint venture with CNPC and 
Kazakhstan’s national gas company, and primarily transports oil to China’s Xinjiang 
region, and it is then transported east through Beijing’s East-West route.195 Despite its 
being a joint venture with 50/50 ownership, CNPC paid 85% of the costs.196 The 
development of the Central Asian Gas Pipeline (CAGP) created four branches, which 
ultimately link other Central Asian suppliers to main lines that were developed by 
China’s NOCs. In return for Chinese investment, Kazakhstan signed multiple agreements 
to provide specific volumes of energy resources through its connection to the CAGP. 
Other projects in which China was the prominent investor and developer were: the 
Atyrau to Alashankou pipeline in 2006, the Atasu to Alashankou pipeline in 2010, and 
the expansion of the CAGP portion with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 2010.197 There 
have been several other development projects in the form of railways, roads, and 
pipelines, all of which ultimately link into a growing network of energy transportation 
corridors under Chinese investment and influence. The power of energy security and 
Beijing’s mission to develop secure resources provides a substantial motive for China to 
settle long-standing border disputes with Kazakhstan in return for these bilateral 
arrangements.198 Similar border dispute resolutions with China have been implemented 
in return for access to other Central-Asian energy markets. 
Similarly, Uzbekistan has been incorporated into the CAGP infrastructure 
network, serving as a transit state to Kazakhstan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. Its 
segment of the CAGP, line-d, began in 2014, and is scheduled to be online by 2016.199 
200 The cost of China footing the bill was an agreement guaranteeing the delivery of 350-
billion cubic feet per year via the CAGP connection.201 CNPC and Petro China are 
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responsible for landing many of these intraregional deals, promising much needed 
infrastructure investment in return for stakes in the projects or companies, and long-term 
contracts.202 
Agreements with Turkmenistan project capacities of up to 2.3-trillion cubic feet 
per year through the CAGP by 2020.203 Talks over the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline would potentially make Pakistan’s port of Gwadar a 
central node for this developing energy architecture.204 The route, development, and 
financing of this mega project have been under debate since 2006, and rumors as late as 
March 2015 indicate that the impasses from the multiple governments may be finally 
reaching an agreement.205 Due to the natural geography within the region, an agreement 
by India allowing Pakistan to potentially hold the key to New Delhi’s access to upstream 
energy supplies would be a huge development. S. Frederick Starr, in his book, The New 
Silk Roads, criticizes the overall status of the region as needing heavy investment in 
transportation infrastructure. China has undoubtedly filled this role and has overcome 
some significant cross-border issues to gain access to valuable energy markets. These 
developments helped to develop an interconnected Asian network of benefit those who 
participate, but are ultimately subject to China’s interests in their energy resources. In the 
event of a disruption of flow, Beijing’s ability to cross into neighboring countries and 
exercise force becomes a threatening scenario. This threat can arguably serve as a 
deterrent and actually add to regional stability, but in the event of failed deterrence, the 
actual price of allowing China in may be the cost. 
While Russia has been resistant to China’s development within Central Asia, it, 
too, has used China’s economic power to help develop infrastructure in return for trade 
agreements. This may be due to lost market shares from Beijing’s development of the 
second Eurasian land bridge. Either way, Russia’s eroding influence in the region has 
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given way to China by accepting Beijing’s money and terms on bilateral agreements. 
CNPC holds a 49% share in a venture in Russia’s Eastern Siberian oil fields (the ESPO 
project).206 With the pipeline operational in 2011, China and Russia entered a 20-year 
agreement for the delivery of 300,000 barrels of oil per day, with plans to add an 
additional 1.6 million b/d by 2020, under an ESPO expansion.207 Additional agreements 
between CNPC and Russia’s Gazprom call for 1.1-billion cubic feet of natural gas per 
year from a joint venture that is expected to become operational by 2018; the 
approximate value of the negotiated deal is worth more than $400 billion over a 30-year 
period.208 Sinopec struck a deal with Russia in 2006, in which it purchased a 49% stake 
in Udmurtneft and cooperated with Rosneft for project development in the oil field.209 
Other projects throughout the region include: a China/Myanmar pipeline for 420 
billion cubic feet per year; CNOOC 50% ownership in the Australian Queensland Curtis 
LNG project; Sinopec’s 25% share of Australian Pacific; CNPC’s 20% ownership of 
Russia’s Yamal LNG; and Sinopec’s development in additional Kyrgyzstan Alai Hollow 
oil fields.210 211 Turkey plays a significant role by linking the developing infrastructure in 
Central Asia to the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport-Corridor While Europe is 
competing for trade and Central-Asian energy markets, Asia’s access to Western markets 
via an alternative land route would help lessen Beijing’s vulnerability to a maritime 
blockage. Another benefit of linking to European markets is that it diversifies the market 
for Central-Asian energy exports and could further reduce the competitiveness and 
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influence of Russia within the region.212 With diminishing market shares in Europe and 
Central Asia, Moscow may continue to seek long-term contracts with China. 
The development of Gwadar port and the associated infrastructure connecting 
Pakistan’s deep-water port to Xinjiang provides a strategic corridor that has the potential 
to bypass the Strait of Malacca and reduce the strain on Beijing’s eastern seaports. While 
the Karakoram highway, and the associated pipelines and railways of the China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC), provide China with access to additional markets, and 
secures an alternative energy route, estimates show the potential for up to $60 billion a 
year for Pakistan in the form of transit fees alone.213 Baluchistan itself sits upon an 
estimated 29-trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 6 billion barrels of oil; thus, further 
investment and development will serve both Pakistan’s developing infrastructure and 
China’s energy security.214 This window to the sea has the potential to link with other 
infrastructure developments and serve as a central node for energy commodity flows 
within the greater Eurasian landscape. Due to its geographical position, it offers Xinjiang 
a relatively shorter and cheaper route to bolster trade within Beijing’s western provinces. 
This access to greater markets at a cheaper price benefits Pakistan in the form of  
transit fees, infrastructure investment, and additional access to markets as trade through 
Gwadar eventually accommodates larger cargo ships, in greater volume. The Economic 
Cooperation Organization estimates that as much as 40% of the region’s trade can be 
channeled through this corridor and greatly bolster the region as a whole.215 The potential 
for the 1,700-km TAPI pipeline to link through Gwadar port could also be used to house 
high-speed, fiber-optic cables in the development of a supervisory control and data 
acquisition telecommunications system.216 Currently, transit times from Asia to Europe 
take as long as 45 days and costs up to $167 per ton. Incorporating the CPEC into the 
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second Eurasian land bridge will help cut the cost to $110 per ton and cover 6,379 km, 
rather than 26,000 km.217 While this strategic “alliance” helps to bolster regional 
economies, the potential for China to use Gwadar port as a military outpost has caused 
concern for the United States and its allies. 
To summarize the cost of doing business with China, all four lines of the CNPC 
effectively link all of the energy producers of the region, and have resulted in Beijing 
owning over 50% of each development.218 Several multibillion dollar loans have been 
issued to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Latin America in return for secured promises of 
gas deliveries.219 China is effectively buying out Central Asia in return for badly needed 
infrastructure development. Ultimately, all of these bilateral agreements and development 
are in the beginning phases of integrating Asian markets through alternative land routes 
and will eventually link the Asian infrastructure to Europe’s extensive network for a 
greater Eurasian trade network. By maintaining a significant share within the developed 
infrastructure, China effectively controls the energy transit routes and has ultimately 
established itself as a significant power in the region.220 An advantage to Beijing’s NOCs 
developing trade relations within the region is that they are not constrained by 
international sanctions and are financed through state-owned banks, allowing for 
investments into areas that Western powers would not typically be able to invest.221 It is 
difficult to differentiate between equity and regular import oil to determine the amount of 
oil Beijing actually receives in return for its investments, but a 2006 study approximates 
that less than 10% of Beijing’s imports for that year was in the form of equity oil.222 A 
decade of unprecedented economic growth and energy demand cannot be satiated by such 
modest returns. While these developments have the potential to diversify sources, they 
are limited in volume and have a limited utility for providing energy security. 
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China’s efforts to develop overland transportation routes and develop trade 
agreements are useful in a relatively peaceful environment. America’s use of oil against 
Japan in World War II, however, demonstrated that despite Japan capturing the Dutch 
East Indies, targeting transportation routes to the homeland rendered the Japanese war 
machine impotent. Overland routes are constrained in volume when compared to 
maritime transport and are considerably more vulnerable, due to their length and 
indefensibility. Russia has demonstrated that pipeline infrastructures can be manipulated 
to disrupt the flow of energy resources anywhere along the established route. 
China’s Navy has increased its operations further from its coastline. Since 
February 2015, at least four submarine deployments from China have entered the Indian 
Ocean and each deployment was conducted by different classes of submarines within 
Beijing’s arsenal for two suspected reasons: first, to demonstrate the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy’s capability to operate as a Blue Water Navy and, second, to showcase their 
military assets to potential buyers.223 Indian officials have expressed growing concerns 
over China’s alleged antipiracy operations as a façade for demonstrating their ability to 
pose a credible force; Brahma Chellaney described the submarine port call to Colombo, 
Sri Lanka, in autumn of 2014 as their first operation within the region in 600 years.224 
Just last month, The Wall Street Journal reported the presence of five Chinese warships 
off the coast of Alaska during President Obama’s visit to the state, signifying the first 
time that China had ventured within U.S. territorial waters.225 While contested regions 
within the resource-rich East and South China Seas have not produced territorial dispute 
resolutions, as in the case with several Central-Asian border disputes, China’s conduct in 
the Spratly Islands have demonstrated Beijing’s commitment to bringing resource-rich 
areas directly under their control. Despite international disapproval and the signing of the 
2002 Declaration of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea, Beijing has continued to 
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develop infrastructure on the Spratlys and has begun challenging maritime and air traffic 
in the area.226 Thus far, China’s developments and actions have not met sufficient 
opposition by any country. China has also established an ADIZ in the contested 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, overlapping Japan’s internationally recognized air space.227 The 
question facing many Western analysts and policy makers is how to answer these actions 
without inciting a conflict and if this is indicative of how China will safeguard its energy 
resources as its military reaches maturity. China’s actions have prompted several 
governments in the region to request that the United States increase its presence in the 
region, and have prompted others to increase their own military forces. Japan, for 
example, has shifted from a defense force to one capable of a combat role.228 Assertive 
actions have not been limited to regions of territorial dispute. In 2001, the USNS 
Bowditch; in 2009, the USNS Impeccable; and, lastly, in 2013, the USS Cowpens were 
all subject to aggressive actions forcing them to vacate China’s Economic Exclusion 
Zone (EEZ).229 Operations within the EEZ of foreign countries are granted by 
international law; thus, aggressive actions to deny access to a global common space is a 
manifestation of access denial.230 
China is growing increasingly dependent upon foreign imports despite measures 
of diversifying sources over land and sea. The development of a modern military to 
protect its national interests have yet to clearly delineate to what degree China is willing 
to enforce its access to energy markets. While China is not alone in developing 
infrastructure in Central Asia, The New Silk Roads describes a system that is still 
inefficient due to trade barriers. The resulting bilateral agreements have become what is 
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known as the “noodle bowl.”231 Overlapping agreements with preferential tariff and taxes 
toward certain states, for certain goods, has created a system that is inhibited by border 
inefficiencies. Even as developments of a regional network are nearing relative 
integration, these inefficiencies will prevent the region from reaching its full potential. In 
2010, the United States proposed the TPP in order to create a World Trade Organization 
plus standard, in which more-developed countries would be able to more easily access 
markets within the region and enjoy intellectual right guarantees.232 This proposal 
targeted the region as a whole and sought to incorporate any willing state without 
exclusion. In response to this, Beijing headed the proposal for the RCEP, focusing upon a 
regional system that excludes the United States and other Western states.233 The RCEP is 
not as robust as the TPP and promotes a regional network, rather than one that is 
integrated into the international framework. The exclusionary tone of Beijing’s proposal 
has placed pressure upon regional actors to potentially side with either China or the 
Western powers. Because of China’s growing influence and investments within Central 
Asia, more states may be inclined to side with China due to greater economic benefit and 
economic dependence upon Beijing. 
The U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region is represented by the TPP and an 
increase in military assets to the region. The shale revolution has afforded Washington 
some leverage in shifting toward the Pacific and some speculate that it may be to draw 
China’s resources into the region as the United States reduces its presence.234 
Washington has expressed the necessity to develop a cooperative relationship with 
Beijing, despite China’s seeming unwillingness to accept the TPP and reduce its 
assertiveness in contested waters of the East and South China Seas. By reducing 
America’s military presence in the Middle East, and potentially exposing an area of vital 
importance to Beijing’s energy supplies, China will be more inclined to actively secure 
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the region with its limited military capabilities. These limited capabilities could 
potentially open cooperative relations between the region’s two eminent powers. 
According to a Congressional Research Report, “the fundamental goal underpinning the 
shift is to devote more effort to influence the development of the Asia-Pacific’s norms, 
rules, particularly as China emerges as an ever-more influential regional power.”235 
Several policy reports note that Washington has shifted its allocation of funding to 
improve capabilities to defeat A2/AD capabilities, which are known to be a focus for 
China’s military.236 What is of growing concern is that the theory of economic 
interdependence resulting from the globalization does not necessarily require the types of 
modernized military equipment that China has been acquiring. Beijing is building 
offensive capabilities, rather than following the trend toward counterinsurgency, stability 
operations, and humanitarian intervention.237 The development of ballistic and cruise 
missiles, attack submarines, and long-range air defense capabilities, indicate a buildup for 
interstate warfare, rather than preserving peace and stability. Washington has responded 
by repositioning additional military assets throughout the region.238 Washington has 
developed what is called the Air Sea Battle, in which it seeks to maintain maritime 
capabilities despite budget cuts. This concept has been crafted to “deter the People’s 
Republic of China from territorial aggression or sea access denial in the Western Pacific, 
and, failing that, to defeat its armed forces.”239 War games centered on this concept focus 
upon a potential conflict in 2028, based upon capabilities and tactics resembling China’s 
force. The positioning of additional assets in the region anticipates the participation of 
Australia and Japan in countering this threat.240 
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In conclusion, China’s economic growth has bolstered Beijing into a growing 
world power. China’s growing involvement in the region center upon energy security 
considerations, with the added benefit of increasing trade infrastructure, which also helps 
facilitate GDP growth for all countries involved. Due to the geographic layout of borders 
and energy commodity distribution, the nature of these relations center upon energy 
harvesting infrastructure and transportation infrastructure, which must pass through 
borders outside of Beijing’s control. This produces vulnerability to regional unrest and 
makes stabilizing these vital regions a priority for China. The potential benefit of 
developing resources in contested water would give Beijing direct access to alternative 
sources of energy, without the added risk of regional governments, and reduce the risk of 
transportation cut disruptions. To help mitigate the risk of maritime disruptions through 
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, China is developing a Blue Water Navy in order to 
protect its interests and to deter the blockage of these strategic locations. The untangling 
of the “noodle bowl” will either be accomplished by the U.S.-led TPP or China’s RCEP 
to help regulate and streamline cross-border interactions. Neither of these frameworks 
have been agreed upon as yet, nor do they explicitly regulate energy commodities, but 
either one would help to alleviate the inefficiency of the current system. Jean A. Garrison 
and Ahad Abdurahmonov, explain that “dominant voices in the energy security debate 
describe the competition for energy resources as a zero-sum, realist game that will lead to 
future resource wars among prominent system-shaping states.”241 Others would argue 
that the complexity found within interdependence will diffuse this resource competition 
and that the use of force would be unlikely used due to its counterproductivity.242 The 
question remains as to whether or not China will develop a cooperative relationship in 
securing the global commons, or if it will exercise its military force, once it reaches 
maturity, to gain preferential shares once global demand is too great to be met by world 
production. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
The following three case studies are analyzed due to the nature of energy 
considerations in state policy: Washington’s use of energy diplomacy and energy as a 
strategic weapon against Japan in World War II, the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and Russia’s 
evolving relationship with Europe in the post-Cold War era in order to understand 
energy-related variables that affected policy makers’ decisions. In all of these examples, 
access to energy resources was leveraged as a tool of coercive diplomacy enabled by the 
exporter’s large market share of target country imports. The outcomes in these examples 
vary, but general results did not achieve policy objectives. 
A. JAPAN 
Washington’s use of energy diplomacy and energy as a strategic weapon against 
Japan in World War II is relevant to this thesis by demonstrating how energy played a 
role in prompting Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and its role as a 
strategic weapon after the onset of military actions. This section will be organized by 
analysis of Washington and Tokyo’s decision-making process, followed by implications 
following Pearl Harbor. 
Developments in World War II before the attack on Pearl Harbor preoccupied 
Washington with a “Europe first” mind-set, which also affected Japan’s calculus of a 
limited response from Washington given America’s commitment to Europe.243,244 
Despite President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s belief that an oil embargo on Japan would 
likely result in Japan attacking the oil-rich Dutch East Indies and end in war, he did not 
revoke the decision by Secretary of State officials, Dean Acheson and Stanley Hornbeck, 
to include oil in the freezing-of-Japanese-assets order in the summer of 1941.245 Tokyo’s 
use of oil was relatively low at the time, accounting for approximately 7% of its energy 
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mix, most of which was consumed by its massive Navy. Domestic production of the 
empire was only able to meet 7% of its total demand, requiring them to import a majority 
of their crude.246 The United States accounted for 80% of Tokyo’s imports and the 
remaining 10% came from the Dutch East Indies.247 As early as 1934, the prospect of 
using oil to frighten Japan into abandoning its objective was circulating among policy 
makers, but the fear of implications that an embargo might cause prevented it from being 
implemented until the end of July 1941.248 The aim of Washington’s policies were to 
prevent Japan’s expansionist campaigns through three actions: “(1) redeployment of most 
of the U.S. Fleet from southern California to Pearl Harbor . . . ; (2) imposition of 
economic sanctions, culminating in the oil embargo . . . ; and (3) a last-minute attempt to 
strengthen U.S. military power in Southeast Asia . “249 Implemented in hopes of forcing 
Japan to abandon its campaign and bring them to the negotiating table, Washington and 
its allies failed to understand Japan’s objectives and willingness to achieve them.250 
Ultimately, the oil embargo resulted in Japan’s decision to move south in an attempt to 
control the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies, which necessitated the destruction of 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor as a means of achieving success. After 
entering the war, the United States used oil as a strategic weapon, rather than a 
diplomatic means of exerting pressure. The United States effectively cut Japan off from 
all petroleum resources external to its mainland through blockades, unrestricted 
submarine warfare, and aerial bombings. A survey by Japan in 1945 to determine 
whether war was still a viable option revealed that their war economy had been 
immobilized and depleted of their two-year strategic oil supply; Japan had less than a 
million barrels remaining, rendering its military force nearly useless.251 Oil was 
identified as Japan’s critical vulnerability by both Tokyo and Washington before the 
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onset of armed conflict. For Japan, their policies aimed to reduce its dependence upon 
foreign oil, while the United States sought to leverage its supply to pressure Japan into 
negotiations and later to immobilize Japan’s economy and military force. Tokyo’s 
inability to secure an uninterrupted supply of energy did not end the conflict, but played 
to the American’s strategic advantage. During the later years of the war, discussions in 
Washington began to focus on the Middle East, as exploration in the region promised 
enormous petroleum reserves.252 
Japan’s expansionist policies during World War II were an effort to control 
resource rich territories that could facilitate Tokyo’s continued economic growth without 
depending upon raw material imports from outside powers.253 In response to Tokyo’s 
actions in the Asia-Pacific region, Washington notified Japan that it was annulling the 
1911 commercial treaty in July 1939 and began implementing embargoes on exports to 
Japan in January 1940. It subsequently expanded sanctioned materials in July, September, 
and December of the same year.254 In November 1941, four months after oil was 
included in the sanctions, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, reported to 
Washington that “the greater part of Japanese commerce has been lost, Japanese 
industrial production has been drastically curtailed, and Japan’s national resources have 
been depleted.”255 That same month, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo warned the Imperial 
Conference that Japan would be doomed to become a third-class nation if nothing was 
done and added that their petroleum reserves would be depleted within two years, 
effectively immobilizing their military.256 By moving south, Japan would be able to seize 
the Dutch East Indies to gain control over oil production and other resources and 
relinquish its dependence upon the United States.257 While Japan did not want to go to 
war with America, conceding to Washington’s demands to forfeit its already acquired 
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territories and cease its actions in the region was an unacceptable ultimatum that 
strengthened the call for action in light of Washington’s sanctions.258 In evaluating the 
potential outcome of war, most of Japan’s policy makers did not think that Japan could 
defeat the United States in a prolonged war, but that they could achieve limited success in 
a swift seizure of Southeast Asia and by fortifying the region enough that America would 
be unwilling to commit the required forces due to its engagements in Europe and 
ultimately accept Japan’s position.259 Japan also realized, that in terms of time, their 
relative military power would decline compared to Washington’s, based upon America’s 
Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. Japan’s relative ratio of naval tonnage would decrease to 
“65 percent in 1942, 50 percent in 1943, and 30 percent in 1944.”260 The strategic 
objective of the attack on Pearl Harbor was “to knock out the U.S. Pacific Fleet for at 
least 6 months so that Japan could conquer Southeast Asia without American naval 
interference.”261 The objective of Japan’s move southward, as communicated in “The 
Essentials for Carrying Out the Empires Policies” to the Emperor, were: 
To expel the influence of [the United States, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands] from East Asia, to establish a sphere for self-defense and 
self-preservation of our Empire, and to build a New Order in Greater East 
Asia. In other words, we aim to establish a close and inseparable 
relationship in military, political, and economic affairs between our 
Empire and the countries of the Southern Region, to achieve our Empire’s 
self-defense and self-preservation.262 
Washington’s use of oil as a tool of coercive diplomacy failed to halt Japan’s 
expansionist campaigns and factored into Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor. The 
attack on Hawaii ultimately failed to significantly degrade the U.S. Pacific Fleet and 
neglected to destroy critical infrastructure vital to sustained U.S. military operations on 
the island.263 Despite gaining control of oil production in the Dutch East Indies, Japan 
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was unable protect the shipment of petroleum to the mainland from U.S. attacks. 
America’s submarine force was modest in comparison to its surface combatants, but 
accounted for 55% of Japan’s lost merchant vessels. The United States was sinking 
Tokyo’s oil tankers faster than Japan could produce them and, by 1945, production all but 
disappeared.264 By 1942, fuel shortages were beginning to have strategic implications on 
Japan’s ability to utilize its forces.265 Fuel conservation dictated slower cruising speeds, 
restricted maneuvers to direct engagements, and restricted the use of their fuel intense 
Battleships.266 In an attempt to preserve petroleum reserves for military use, Tokyo 
implemented policies restricting the use of civilian petroleum and began to strip the 
nation of resources that could be converted to usable fuel. As a result, civilian 
consumption dropped to 4% of its 1940 figures by 1944, and synthetic fuel production 
failed to produce sufficient quantities once domestic resources were exhausted.267 Fuel 
shortages also dictated shorter flight school training times; the result of which increased 
the shortage of skilled pilots and weighed on Japan aviation strategy, which required 
“eight bombers and sixteen fighters” to sink a U.S. capital ship. Tokyo’s strategists 
concluded that the same affect could be achieved by “one to three suicide plans” and 
would only require half of the fuel allotment due to no return flight.268 Vehicles and ships 
were converted to run on coal or biomass, greatly reducing speed, maneuverability, and 
reliability; in effect, Japan’s inability to procure or produce sufficient oil greatly 
contributed to their defeat.269 Fuel shortages were so severe by the end of the war that the 
only vehicle available to transport General Douglas MacArthur from Atsugi to 
Yokohama to sign the instrument of surrender was coal fired and repeatedly broke down 
during the 12-mile journey.270 
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B. ARAB OIL EMBARGO OF 1973 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo adds to this thesis by providing another example of 
coercive energy diplomacy and the effects it has had on the world’s oil market. Today’s 
energy strategies and policies are a result of events occurring between 1960 and 1990: 
energy conservation, diversification, environmental concerns, and security policies were 
developed to protect access to oil in the Middle East, while minimizing vulnerability to 
disruptions from the area. This section will be organized by analysis of developments 
prior to the 1973 embargo, its immediate effects, and then post-embargo developments. 
Experiences in World War II show the strategic value of oil as a tool of coercive 
diplomacy and as a strategic weapon. U.S. production during the war supplied nearly 
90% of allied oil and represented approximately 70% of the world’s production, which 
was vital to sustained allied operations throughout the war.271As early as 1943, U.S. 
officials realized that America would not be able to sustain domestic production due to 
the decline of reserve discoveries and the growth in demand, which would lead to it 
becoming dependent upon petroleum imports. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
warned that “if there should be a World War III it would have to be fought with someone 
else’s petroleum, because the United States wouldn’t have it.”272 In 1943, Everette Lee 
DeGolyer was sent on a special foreign mission to analyze the potential petroleum 
reserves in the Middle East and returned early in 1944, reporting that “the center of 
gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf-Caribbean area to the Middle 
East-to the Persian Gulf Area.”273 Seeking to preserve America’s petroleum, the prospect 
of increased production in Middle East would offer an alternative source of cheap oil, not 
only for the United States, but for Europe, which had traditionally depended upon the 
United States for supplies.274  
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In mid-February 1945, President Roosevelt met with King Ibn Saud of Saudi 
Arabia onboard the USS Quincy to discuss the prospects of “a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine, oil, and the postwar configuration of the Middle East.”275 While the King’s 
commentary suggested a Jewish homeland in Germany, he sought a continued assurance 
of American interests in the region after the war.276 Three years later, America became a 
net importer of oil and recognized Israel as a state after the Jewish National Council 
proclaimed it a state, despite being warned by King Saud that U.S. “support of a Jewish 
state . . . would be a death blow to American interests in the Arab world.”277 The ensuing 
Arab-Israeli War strained American relations in the region and provided the Arab League 
with the option of disrupting oil supplies in order to pressure the world to abandon Israel. 
King Saud warned that he may not desire to place sanctions on American oil concessions, 
but pressure from the Arab world may obligate him to.278 Developments in the oil 
market, international and domestic, went through several changes up to the first Arab oil 
embargo in 1967. First, the market became overcrowded as a result of additional supply 
sources coming online. The Soviets, in particular, played a substantial role by 
undercutting market prices to gain market share.279 In order to stay competitive, foreign 
companies in the Middle East reduced spot prices, which were manifested in the 
establishment of OPEC on September 14, 1960.280 Despite President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s reluctance to implement protectionist policies, on March 10, 1959, he 
limited U.S. imports to 9% of total consumption. Over the ensuing 14-year period, 
Americans paid higher oil prices relative to the rest of the world, but President 
Eisenhower’s action had the benefit of not only preserving domestic production, but 
production capacity increased some 29% by 1968.281 
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The first attempt at harnessing the “oil weapon” was in 1967, during the third 
Arab-Israeli War.282 On June 6, Arab oil ministers cut production by 60% and placed 
embargos on states friendly to Israel, targeting the United States, Great Britain, and West 
Germany.283 By September, however, the embargo was lifted and had proved to be 
ineffective in pressuring the West into abandoning support for Israel.284 The outcome of 
the Arab-Israeli War left Israel in possession “of the Sinai, all of Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, and the Golan Heights.”285 The West was able to mitigate the effects of the 
embargo by coordinating shipments of non-Arab petroleum to embargoed nations and 
shipments originally destined for the West elsewhere, and, in effect, largely avoided a 
significant impact on import levels.286 Increased demand for oil eventually started 
catching up with available production in 1970, spare production in 1967 was three 
million b/d and reduced to approximately 500,000 b/d.287 A combination of 
nationalization of oil companies in the Middle East and the increase of President 
Eisenhower’s import cap in 1971 made the United States and other Western powers more 
dependent upon Gulf imports. The United States notified its European allies two years 
prior that America’s spare production would no longer be able to serve as a security 
measure in the event of a disruption. Even at 100% production levels, the United States 
was unable to meet demand without increasing its import cap.288 Nationalization of oil 
companies occurred throughout OPEC during these time frames: “Libya (1970), Algeria 
(1971–74), Iraq (1972), Venezuela (1974), Kuwait (1975–77) and Saudi Arabia (1973–
1980).”289 State Department official James Akins summarized the impending situation in 
his recognition that any one major supplier could potentially disrupt the world’s oil 
market and that the United States should “act to reduce the growth rate of consumption, 
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raise domestic production, and strive to import from ‘secure sources,’” recognizing that 
doing so would come at a greater cost to consumers.290 A combination of events between 
1967 and 1973 made harnessing the oil weapon more effective: OPEC assumed control 
over production and pricing of oil from foreign companies, the United States removed the 
import quota system in April 1973, and the USSR had been supplying arms to the 
Arabs.291  
At the onset of the fourth Arab-Israeli War on October 5, 1973, an oil embargo 
was not yet implemented, but threatened in the event of continued U.S. support for Israel. 
Washington, however, could not accept an ally being defeated by Soviet forces and 
continued to supply Israel with much needed assistance.292 On October 20, OPEC 
formally enacted the embargo on Washington, depriving the United States of the 6.2 
million barrels it imported from the region.293 Despite increased pressure to remove its 
support for Israel, Washington remained committed to thwarting Soviet advances in the 
region; the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers in the Middle East resulted 
in a cease fire between Israel and Egypt on October 25, 1973, but the embargo remained 
in place.294 The embargo ended nearly five months later and was successful in weakening 
the Western alliance and raising the official posted price to $11.65 per barrel.295 A 
combination of incremental production cuts, increased prices, and gasoline rationing 
drove auction prices even higher. France, Great Britain, and Japan succumbed to OPEC’s 
oil weapon and distanced themselves from Washington, aligning policies with the Arabs 
with regard to Israel.296 Despite these countries’ gaining preferential access to Arabian 
petroleum, the price increase to $11.65 per barrel wreaked havoc on the global economy 
and provided the impetus for cooperation among developed nations. In February 1974, 
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the United States called for an energy conference to develop a cooperative framework to 
safeguard economies from future shortages, creating the IEA.297 Over the next two 
decades, fluctuations in price resulting from the transition toward a market-based 
commodity, rather than long-term contracts; security concerns involving politics and 
stability in the Middle East; Soviet incursion into the Gulf; growing demand/prices; and 
new reserve discoveries/developments helped to shape policies that are still relevant 
today.298 Increased prices and fears of limited availability of the commodity gave 
pertinence to energy efficiency policies, diversification strategies, infrastructure 
development, strategic petroleum reserves, and emergency sharing protocols between 
developed nations in the event of future disruptions.299  
C. RUSSIA AND EUROPE 
Russia’s evolving relationship with Europe in the post-Cold War era is relevant to 
this thesis by providing another example of coercive energy diplomacy and a brief 
analysis of resources gained through the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Unique to this 
case study are the effects that a transit state, Ukraine, had on the relationship between 
Russia and Europe. This study will be organized by a discussion of gas supply 
disruptions, their effects, and, finally, a brief discussion on Crimea. 
The evolving relationship between Russia and Europe in the post-Cold War era 
focuses on events in 2006, 2009, and 2013 into 2014. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 resulted in the establishment of several new states in the post-Soviet bloc. The 
former Soviet Union left a vast network of gas pipelines linking Russian gas fields to 
European markets, with limited alternative options of energy of sufficient volume. 
Ukraine is a key focus in this study and represents the equivalent of maritime shipping 
for transport in the previous two examples. Due to the linear nature of a pipeline, it is not 
possible to divert transit routes without developing additional nodes for resources to be 
diverted. Europe received approximately 40% of its gas from Russia in 2007, 80% of 
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which traversed Ukraine via pipeline, leaving Europe vulnerable to supply disruptions not 
only from Russia, but by Ukraine as a transit state.300,301 Ukraine’s mounting debts to 
Russia and Kiev’s inability or refusal to settle these debts resulted in a four-day 
disruption of gas during the winter of 2006 and a two-week disruption in 2009, affecting 
17 European countries downstream of Ukraine.302 Russia sought to use the repercussive 
effects of cutting supplies to gather pressure from the European Union (EU) on Ukraine 
to settle debts, renegotiate price, and make prepayments for future delivery with limited 
success. In each instance, Russia negotiated repayment terms and set future prices and 
prepayment arrangements, only for Ukraine to default on bilateral agreements.303 Similar 
scenarios occurred in 2013, where negotiations were faltering, but gas supplies were not 
disrupted.304 Following the 2009 disruption, Europe reaffirmed its commitment to 
diversifying energy resources, diversifying suppliers, and increasing energy efficiency in 
order to reduce its dependence upon and vulnerability to Russia’s gas diplomacy, 
manifested in the May 2014 “European Energy Security Strategy.”305 An explanation 
may lie in the fact that gas and oil sales represented 68% of Russia’s total export 
revenues and accounted for nearly 50% of its federal budget in 2013. The gas supply 
disruptions in 2009 caused Russia to lose over $1 billion in uncollected export 
revenue.306 307 While a cut in gas flows from Russia to Europe would inevitably have an 
economic effect, the effectiveness of this practice has become seemingly more 
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detrimental to Russia than to European consumers. The development of alternative 
pipelines, integrated trade systems, increased efficiency, and alternative energy have 
increased European resilience to a disruption in supplies. These developments were partly 
developed because of the strategic advantage that Russia possessed with its energy 
diplomacy.308 
Ukraine’s ambition to reduce its dependence upon Russian energy resources was 
somewhat possible in 2012; Kiev was optimistic in its future developments and claimed 
that it may become a net exporter by 2020.309 The ambition of energy independence 
practically disappeared in March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and gained control 
over the energy resources in the Black Sea.310 Exploration studies conducted by Ukraine 
and Russia before the annexation indicated that Moscow’s portion of the Black Sea 
promised dismal oil and gas deposits, while Ukraine’s area of the Black Sea promised to 
be very rich with energy resources.311 In addition to gaining potential market shares, and 
depriving Ukrainian access, Moscow is now able to develop its South Stream Pipeline on 
a more direct and economical route to Europe, rather than having to bypass Ukraine’s 
Crimean boundaries.312 The 2015 NSS condemns Russia’s actions in Crimea as a 
violation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory and an endangerment to international norms, 
which Moscow has “taken for granted since the end of the Cold War.”313 Washington has 
since implemented sanctions on Russia and made military assistance, as well as energy 
security consultation available through the Freedom Support Act of 2014.314 
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D. CONCLUSION 
These three case studies have progressively helped to shape how governments 
address energy security challenges. The strategic importance that states place on energy 
security goes beyond economic ambitions of export revenues, or continued economic 
growth, but includes politics and military capabilities. Suppliers have increased, and are 
still competing to increase, market shares, whether by undercutting prices through 
production levels or by gaining control of a territory with access to additional reserves. 
The diversification of energy types, diversification of suppliers, efficiency standards, 
strategic petroleum reserves (SPR), and emergency energy mitigation programs have 
been key aspects of importers’ strategies to protect themselves from price hikes and 
supply disruption. The use of coercive energy policies in the case of the Arab oil embargo 
and Russia came at the expense of exporter reputations as reliable suppliers, which 
necessitated importer policies to limit their exposure to the politicized nature of energy 
manipulation. There was limited success in achieving the political objective in these 
examples, but they ultimately failed to achieve their objectives: the U.S. embargo 
prompted Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor; Israel is still in existence; and Ukraine 
succumbed to pressures not from the EU, but through the realization that they risk being 
excluded by the development of alternative transit routes. Another lesson gleaned from 
these examples is the willingness of states to employ force to ensure access to energy 
resources: Japan’s temporary acquisition of the Dutch East Indies; the Carter Doctrine, 
and subsequent campaigns in the Middle East; and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. A 
Brooking’s Institute report describes China as feeling “many of the same vulnerabilities 
as pre-war Japan.”315 Despite diversification of its energy suppliers, transportation 
provides a critical vulnerability where a large portion of Beijing’s imports pass through 
areas of American influence. Seizing control of resources either in the contested waters 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region or seizing control over the SLOCs is an unacceptable 
outcome to the international community, as is denial of access to the SLOCs by the 
United States to China. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusion of this thesis analyzes possible implications on the current 
environment in light of the three case studies in order to identify potential friction points 
between Washington and Beijing. Based upon potential friction points, policy 
recommendations will be made in hopes of preventing conflict. Limitations of these 
recommendations are subject to issues encountered during research and the 
unpredictability of policy decisions. It is impossible to determine the future relationship 
between Beijing and Washington, but aligning policies to pacify potential conflicts and 
contending interests could support the peaceful rise of China. 
A. IMPLICATIONS 
China has been described as feeling the same vulnerabilities as Japan did prior to 
World War II, in that it is heavily dependent upon energy imports.316 Beijing has 
diversified its suppliers, but a upward of 77% of its energy imports converge in transit 
through the SLOCs, which are maintained by U.S. forces.317 Compared to prewar Japan, 
when the United States was responsible for 80% of Tokyo’s imports, the threat of 
Washington leveraging access to the SLOCs would deny Beijing of an equivocal 
percentage of their energy imports.318 Japan’s calculus in deciding to exercise the war 
option was based upon four variables: (1) relative power compared to the United States 
was going to decrease within the next five years; (2) continued reliance on the United 
States for petroleum would subvert them to American interests; (3) U.S. commitments to 
Europe would prevent the redistribution of forces to Asia Pacific in time to deter Japan’s 
acquisitions in southern Asia; and (4) consolidation of U.S. forces in Pearl Harbor 
presented a target of opportunity.319 While China has been accused of being overly 
aggressive with neighboring countries over disputed areas in the Asia-Pacific region, 
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Beijing’s relations with the United States have come short of force.320 Developing 
military capabilities to thwart a U.S. attempt at inciting an energy resource embargo 
through the SLOCs and actions regarding territorial disputes in the East and South China 
Seas are potential points of contention between the United States and China.  
Considering these factors, manipulation of Beijing’s access to supplies may result 
in conflict despite the disparity in conventional forces. It could be suggested that the 
relative disparity between the military forces of the United States and China may become 
less relevant in the near future and may be forgoing conflict until it achieves a 
comparable military force (see Figure 1). Beijing’s policy makers have expressed little 
desire to replace or cooperate with the United States in security operations in the Middle 
East and the SLOCs which they depend on for energy resources.321 The development of 
logistic capabilities along the SLOCs and infrastructure investment in the area, however, 
suggests that Beijing has not forgone security as an objective, but prefers a domestic 
capability to dependence upon U.S. security guarantees.322 According to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, the functionality of the string of pearl suggests that 
anything beyond 200 miles from China’s coastline would be difficult for Beijing to 
sustain or defend against regional actors, who benefit from strategically shorter logistic 
chains.323 Maritime security issues relating to state and non-state actor disruption of the 
SLOCs, for example mining of either of the Straits, may be another consideration in 
Beijing’s military buildup, rather than depending on American forces. Ambiguity in 
Beijing’s intentions revolve around overlapping energy security interests, while greater 
transparency on the part of both the United States and China would help to prevent 
conflict and possibly lead to a cooperative security framework. In the case of territorial 
disputes, Japan viewed the East Dutch Indies as a necessary objective to achieving 
economic longevity and a reduction in dependence upon the United States as an oil 
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supplier.324 The issue emerging in the South and East China Seas revolves around the 
ambiguity of China’s 9-dash line and extensive claims under the UNCLOS.325 In addition 
to potentially erupting into conflict, joint development projects have been forestalled out 
of fear that it would signal recognition of China’s territorial claims.326 Increasing 
domestic production by way of gaining control over resources in the region could also 
weigh upon Beijing’s decisions, similar to Japan’s decision making prior to World War 
II. Contrary to U.S. actions in World War II, the repositioning of forces in the Asia-
Pacific region as a deterrent has deviated from the concentration of forces. The 
redistribution of 60% of the U.S. forces is spread throughout the region, including Japan, 
the Philippines, Australia, and Singapore.327 
The Middle East will continue to play a central role in the world’s energy 
markets, as it possesses nearly half of the world’s proven recoverable reserves and is 
responsible for nearly 30% of the world’s petroleum output.328 Stability and security in 
this region is still within U.S. interests, but policies and global developments resulting 
from the Arab oil embargo in 1973 have contributed to the emergence of a more resilient 
system. Short of an embargo, OPEC has limited options in exerting oil as a tool of 
coercive diplomacy.329 A study of the effectiveness of OPEC since its inception suggests 
that while the organization still has the potential to disrupt a substantial percentage of the 
world’s production, it does not function cohesively in managing production levels.330 
Production quotas and trade settlements are often ignored as member states produce 
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according to individual interests.331 Ongoing issues in the Middle East could potentially 
worsen, as rentier states attempt to restructure their subsidy programs to reduce their 
reliance upon oil revenues.332 Moreover, enacting an embargo before rentier states are 
able to diversify their respective economies would be equally detrimental to suppliers as 
it would to consumers.333 The reduction of U.S. presence in the region is more reflective 
of post-campaign force levels, rather than a result of the U.S. pivot to the Pacific. 
Regardless of the reason, some analysts speculate a deterioration of the traditional 
security for access agreement.334 Increased U.S. oil production has afforded Washington 
the ability to potentially reevaluate commitments to the region as disruptions would likely 
have less of a direct effect upon America’s energy security. China on the other hand, has 
become increasingly dependent upon energy resources from the region which some 
suggest could result in a more cooperative security framework between Washington and 
Beijing.335 The impact of an energy resource disruption on the global economy 
necessitates continued commitments to the region as reflected in the NSS.336 Other 
analysts suggest that Washington may be able to leverage security operations in the 
Middle East as a deterrent to China’s aggressive actions in the Asia-Pacific; continued 
deterioration of peace and stability on the part of China, however, would necessitate the 
relocation of U.S. forces from the Middle East.337,338 
The post-embargo environment has produced a more resilient energy market. 
Decreasing dependence on Middle Eastern oil has shaped policies aimed at decreasing 
demand through efficiency, diversification, and emergency disruption plans. High oil 
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prices have helped to diversify the energy market away from Middle Eastern oil; 
development of additional conventional sources of natural gas and oil throughout the 
world resulted from the world’s energy companies hoping to cash in on large profit 
margins, and avoid instability and nationalization of their investments in the Middle 
East.339 Unconventional and alternative energy have also benefited from high oil prices 
by making them economically feasible or competitive; continued R&D has resulted in 
technological gains that have helped to reduce prices while increasing efficiency.340 
Climate change has become the façade for efficiency and emission standards. The 
solution to reducing GHG emissions, specifically in China’s coal energy production, lies 
in increased efficiency standards and retrofitting existing infrastructure with CCS.341 
Natural gas power plants are also a part of the solution, but as domestic production of 
natural gas necessitates gas imports for many Asian-Pacific countries, increased demand 
throughout the region would result in similar security issues to petroleum imports.342 The 
global petroleum glut and resulting low oil prices make it difficult for capital intensive 
technologies and methodologies to compete.343,344 Policies that incentivize cleaner 
technology despite low oil prices are necessary to meet the two-degree goal by 
2020.345,346 While China is not a member of the IEA, its participation in a 2002 
emergency disruption scenario, development of an SPR, increased efficiency standards, 
and emission controls have the potential to lead to more cooperation under the guise of 
climate change initiatives.347 
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Implications of Russia’s evolving relationship with Europe in the post-Cold War 
era suggest that the global energy market has diffused the centrality of energy supplies to 
discourage the use of coercive energy strategies.348 Nonetheless, the issue of transit states 
as it relates to pipelines adds an additional vulnerability to disruption. Overland transit 
routes have expanded as a result of energy security strategies of diversifying supplies and 
routes, but they require additional policy alignment between trans-border nations to 
reduce border inefficiencies. Despite having vast energy reserves, Moscow’s annexation 
Crimea in 2014, and its resulting control over additional energy resources, suggests a 
land grab motivated by energy resources.349,350 Control over resources, as in Japan’s case 
in World War II, and China’s existing claims in the Asia-Pacific Region suggests the 
possibility of conflict stemming from similar motivations in the annexation of Crimea. 
China’s development of the second Eurasian land bridge played a role in Russia and 
Ukraine’s calculation in the use of energy politics in 2014, and has had an effect upon 
Russia’s demand security considerations to a similar shift toward the Asia-Pacific 
region.351 
In summation, supplies of Middle Eastern oil to China through the SLOCs will 
become increasingly vital to Beijing’s economic and political interests. The same is true 
for the globalized system, but China being the largest consumer of energy resources 
transported through this route necessitates a military capacity to secure its access.352 
Climate change is becoming increasingly relevant to China’s energy security policies, as 
Beijing seeks to reduce pollution associated with its coal power infrastructure to placate 
domestic pressures over its effects.353 Similarly, domestic pressure is calling for China to 
exert its territorial claims in the Asia-Pacific region.354 Forgoing its developments on the 
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Spratly Islands would be unlikely, but the ongoing territorial disputes between China and 
regional actors over control of resources has the potential to escalate into conflict and 
obligate U.S. involvement under various defense treaties.355 In the near-term, Beijing’s 
energy security strategies can decrease the nation’s energy intensity, but projected growth 
will still result in an increased demand.356 Controlling additional petroleum and natural 
gas reserves in the Asia-Pacific region would allow Beijing to increase domestic 
production and serve as a source of national pride for not conceding to demands by the 
international community. In the words of President Barrack Obama, “if we don’t write 
the rules, China will write the rules out in that region. We will be shut out. ”357 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations in this section are based on objectives of reducing the risk of 
conflict emerging from territorial disputes, issues associated with access to the SLOCs, 
and enhancing U.S. energy security. Limitations in these recommendations are confined 
to the scope of variables considered in the research, which do not account for cultural 
elements or catastrophic events in the environment. Addressing the underlying issues of 
territorial disputes and SLOC access would potentially provide a framework for the 
Arctic region, as it becomes increasingly accessible and for the incorporation India’s 
future energy demand. 
In keeping with Washington’s codified national interests in the NSS, 
establishment of a “rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership” would 
be enabled by either creating a separate agreement or utilizing the UNCLOS to settle 
territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.358 Further research into possible 
implications of the U.S. ratification of the UNCLOS is recommended for future study. 
Within negotiations, arbitration should focus on delimiting China’s nine dash line to 
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acceptable terms between regional states. The Spratly Islands will likely be a 
development that China is unwilling to forfeit, but could provide a leverage point to 
achieve the best acceptable terms in settling disputed areas. Within this said agreement 
should be a clause stipulating limitations on UNCLOS legal authority granted to 
manmade structures or to areas of overlapping territorial claims within an agreed upon 
geographic range, example, overlapping claims originating from geographical features 
within two nautical miles of each other. The potential for cooperation between regional 
states exists in the form of joint development of resources, but hesitation resulting from 
issue of sovereignty has prevented progress.359 By delimiting China’s claims and 
clarifying its legal bounds under the UNCLOS or a new agreement would provide the 
necessary arbitration of acceptable terms to avoid conflict. 
Whether China is forestalling military conflict to reduce the disparity in 
conventional power, or has limited objectives in developing the capability to defend its 
interests against SLOC disruption or access denial, increased military-to-military 
cooperation is needed to prevent conflict. It is not within America’s interest to leverage 
China’s access to the SLOCs as a policy option. Doing so would potentially have 
implications to similar effects of the U.S. oil embargo on Japan during World War II. 
Increased transparency and dialogue resulting from a cooperative security arrangement of 
the SLOCs would potentially reduce the threat perception posed by U.S. military forces 
in the Asia Pacific. The United States should maintain its cooperative developments in 
the region to enhance regional security capabilities, specifically within the Strait of 
Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, but should take a more direct 
approach by incorporating China in this strategy.  
Similar to policies before the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the United States should 
enact protectionist policies to prevent atrophy of domestic production resulting from low 
oil prices. In addition to reducing U.S. reliance on oil imports, Washington would 
potentially gain the ability to influence “floor” prices of oil on the international markets. 
Future studies on the cost-benefit comparison between U.S. protectionist policy costs to 
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major exporter budgetary impacts, based upon various prices would help to determine a 
balanced target floor price. Within the calculus of exporting nations, specifically OPEC, 
the rational of sustained production at low prices can be assumed to have been made with 
the acknowledgment of the acceptable cost of running budget deficits, as experienced by 
Saudi Arabia in 2015.360 Introducing protectionist policies to U.S. production would 
require the world’s major suppliers to reevaluate production levels to match prices and 
benefit from increased profits, or possibly increase production in an effort to increase 
market shares. Regardless of the second- or third-order effects of protectionist policies, 
increased or sustained domestic production is vital to America’s energy security strategy. 
Climate change, growing populations, and increasing energy demands will continue to 
strain the rentier state model; the 2015 McKinsey Report suggests drastic changes be 
made to Saudi Arabia’s economy in order for it to remain a viable state.361 China’s 
increased dependence upon Middle Eastern oil, relative to that of the United States, could 
potentially lead to increased cooperation in security operations in the region. 
The United States should maintain its policies regarding the TPP, regional 
security development, and development of A2/AD capabilities. The United States should 
also continue to advocate climate change initiatives in order to affect demand side 
controls of efficiency and emission standards in developing countries. Offering solutions 
to countries that would otherwise be unable to afford clean technology alternatives or 
possess the technological know-how to affect demand related controls will help to reduce 
the world’s demand for petroleum and gas. Within the NSS, President Obama states that, 
“there are no global problems that can be solved without the United States, and few that 
can be solved by the United States alone.”362 
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